Crypto-Collateral by Tu, Kevin V.
Science and Technology Law Review 
Volume 21 Number 2 Article 5 
2018 
Crypto-Collateral 
Kevin V. Tu 
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, ktu@law.umaryland.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/scitech 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kevin V. Tu, Crypto-Collateral, 21 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 205 (2018) 
https://scholar.smu.edu/scitech/vol21/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Science and Technology Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more 




The use of cryptocurrency has permeated new industries. As it does so,
the need to confront the broader commercial law implications of cryptocur-
rency, particularly the applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.), becomes more pronounced. For example, creditors and debtors in-
creasingly use cryptocurrency as collateral. But Article 9 of the U.C.C. does
not expressly mention cryptocurrency. Fortunately, Article 9 is flexible
enough to accommodate the collateralization of cryptocurrency within its
currently defined collateral types. The foregoing, notwithstanding Article 9,
could be amended to improve the functionality of Article 9 for those to en-
gage in secured transactions with crypto-collateral. Rather than build upon
the existing literature on how to optimize Article 9 collateral, this article
examines the broader question of whether Article 9 should be amended to
better accommodate crypto-collateral. This article suggests that the decision
to amend Article 9 involves more than simply determining the most appropri-
ate framework for enforcing security interests in crypto-collateral. Other con-
siderations include: (1) the challenge of enacting a uniform amendment; (2)
the uncertain future of cryptocurrency; and (3) the impact of further normal-
izing the use of cryptocurrency. Accordingly, this article does not seek to
definitively answer the question of whether or how to amend Article 9 for
cryptocurrency. Instead, it endeavors to deepen the conversation by examin-
ing some of the considerations at play so that informed decisions can be
made by policymakers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrency has carved out a place in commercial transactions—ini-
tially as a method of payment for goods1 and more recently as collateral for
secured obligations.2 In fact, a new industry of crypto-secured loan providers
has even emerged.3 These loan providers specifically target the owners of
cryptocurrency with a simple proposition—leverage the value of your
cryptocurrency without having to sell it.4 Although far from ubiquitous, the
growing prevalence of cryptocurrency in commercial transactions highlights
the importance of examining its broader commercial law implications.
1. See Kevin V. Tu & Michael Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation
in the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 286–91 (2015); see also Jerry Brito
& Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin: A Primer for Policymakers, MERCATUS CTR.
14–19 (2016), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/gmu_bitcoin_042516_
webv3_0.pdf; Brian Patrick Eha, More Major Retailers Are Getting Ready to
Accept Bitcoin, ENTREPRENEUR (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/
article/231134.
2. See Kevin V. Tu, Perfecting Bitcoin, 52 GA. L. REV. 505, 539–44 (2018); see
also Pamela J. Martinson & Christopher P. Masterson, The Hazards of Lending
to Bitcoin Users, AM. BANKER (Jan. 2, 2014, 12:00 PM), https://www.ameri-
canbanker.com/opinion/the-hazards-of-lending-to-bitcoin-users (“Owned
Bitcoin has the potential to be collateral for loans, but creditors are likely more
concerned with restricting Bitcoin acquisition or use by borrowers due to the
uncertain regulatory landscape, irreversible nature of payments, extreme vola-
tility of value and anonymity of the system.”); Jonathan W. Riley, Heads I Win,
Tails You Lose? Bitcoin as Collateral is Not a Good Bet, LENDING L. REPORT
(Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.lendinglawreport.com/2014/01/articles/collateral/
heads-i-win-tails-you-lose-bitcoin-as-collateral-is-not-a-good-bet/ (discussing
the pros and cons of accepting Bitcoin as collateral); Wallace Young, What
Community Bankers Should Know About Virtual Currencies, COMMUNITY
BANKING CONNECTIONS (2015), https://cbcfrs.org/articles/2015/q2/virtual-cur-
rencies (discussing the posting of virtual currency as collateral for a loan).
3. See Vincent Ryan, Lenders Now Taking Bitcoin as Collateral, CFO (Jan. 4,
2018), http://ww2.cfo.com/credit/2018/01/lenders-now-taking-bitcoin-collat-
eral/; Jon Southurst, Huobi Will Now Take Your Bitcoins as Stock Trading Col-
lateral, COINDESK (May 5, 2015, 11:54 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/
huobi-will-now-take-your-bitcoins-as-stock-trading-collateral/; Will Yakowicz,
Bitcoin Millionaires Have a New Way to Cash Out Without Ever Selling a
Single Bitcoin, INC. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.inc.com/will-yakowicz/loan-
startups-accept-cryptocurrency-collateral.html; Abic Corporation Offers
Crypto-Secured Loans, COINWIRE (June 5, 2018), https://www.coinwire.com/
abic-corporation-offers-cryptocurrency-secured-loans; Unchained Capital An-
nounces Crypto-Secured Loans are Now Available to the Public, BUSINESS
WIRE (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/2017113000
5323/en/Unchained-Capital-Announces-Crypto-Secured-Loans-Public.
4. See supra note 3.
2018] Crypto-Collateral 207
Commercial law, however, has largely ignored cryptocurrency.5 Uni-
form Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Article 9 does not expressly recognize
cryptocurrency.6 As a result, a degree of uncertainty exists about how
cryptocurrency fits into the existing provisions of Article 9.7 The legal uncer-
tainty has not deterred the practice of collateralizing cryptocurrency.8 But it
has prompted discussion about issues of practical import.9 Do the existing
provisions of Article 9 permit the use of cryptocurrency?10 If so, how does
one obtain a valid and enforceable security interest in crypto-collateral? How
can the process of collateralizing cryptocurrency be improved? The author
builds upon this foundation in this article.
The author starts with a core premise—Article 9 provides a means of
creating and enforcing security interests in cryptocurrency.11 But Article 9’s
legal framework is far from perfect.12 As such, it is capable of improve-
ment.13 That is, Article 9 could be optimized for the unique attributes of
crypto-collateral.14 But the question of whether to amend Article 9 for
crypto-collateral is more complicated. It involves more than simply reaching
consensus on the best way to accommodate crypto-collateral under Article 9.
Accordingly, this article’s primary contribution is the identification and ex-
amination of additional considerations relevant to the decision, including: (1)
the challenges of developing and enacting a uniform amendment to Article 9;
(2) the uncertain future of cryptocurrency; and (3) whether the continued
growth of mainstream cryptocurrency use remains advisable.
5. See Tu, supra note 2, at 513–15, 545.
6. See U.C.C. § 9-102 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’R ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010); see also Tu, supra note 2, at 513.
7. See Craig Barnett, Cyber-Lending: Perfecting Security Interests in the New
Frontier of Cryptocurrency Backed Loans, BLOCKCHAIN MAG. (July 11, 2018),
https://blockchainmagazine.net/cyber-lending-perfecting-security-interests-in-
the-new-frontier-of-cryptocurrency-backed-loans/; Ryan M. Behrman, How Do
You Perfect and Enforce a Security Interest in Virtual Currencies?, 25-3
CLARK’S BANK DEPOSITS & PAYMENTS MONTHLY (Mar. 2016); George K.
Fogg, The UCC and Bitcoins: Solution to Existing Fatal Flaw, 104 BBR 741
(Apr. 14, 2015); Bob Lawless, Is UCC Article 9 the Achilles Heel of Bitcoin?,
CREDIT SLIPS (Mar. 10, 2014, 8:17 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/
2014/03/is-ucc-article-9-the-achilles-heel-of-bitcoin.html; Tu, supra note 2, at
546–50.
8. See supra notes 2–3.
9. See supra note 7.
10. See supra note 7; see also Ronald Mann, Reliable Perfection of Security Inter-
ests in Crypto-Currency, SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
11. See Mann, supra note 10; Tu, supra note 2, at 516.
12. See Mann, supra note 10; Tu, supra note 2, at 516.
13. See Fogg, supra note 7; Tu, supra note 2, at 557–78.
14. See Fogg, supra note 7; Tu, supra note 2, at 557–78.
208 SMU Science and Technology Law Review [Vol. XXI
Part II begins by examining the use of cryptocurrency as collateral in
secured transactions, including the reasons that cryptocurrency is valuable as
collateral. Part III summarizes how cryptocurrency fits into the existing pro-
visions of U.C.C. Article 9. Part IV looks to the future of crypto-collateral
under Article 9 and contends that informed deliberations about amending
Article 9 require a more expansive perspective, because cryptocurrency im-
plicates issues beyond the U.C.C.
II. THE GROWTH OF CRYPTO-COLLATERAL
The practice of secured lending (or asset-based lending) is hardly new.
Borrowers have long pledged assets as security for a repayment obligation,
granting lenders the right to foreclose upon the pledged asset in the event of a
default. What is a relatively new phenomenon, however, is the use of
cryptocurrency as collateral. Instead of securing loans with more traditional
assets such as inventory,15 accounts receivable,16 and equipment,17 some
lenders and borrowers are now turning to cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin
and Ethereum.18
Part II briefly examines the use of cryptocurrency collateral, focusing
first on the question of why a lender or borrower would want to use
cryptocurrency as collateral before describing some of the ways that a secur-
ity interest in cryptocurrency might arise.
A. Why Crypto-Collateral?
Collateral serves a vital role in a lending transaction. For the lender,
collateral mitigates the risk of default by the buyer. It acts as a secondary
source of repayment if the buyer fails to pay. Collateral, therefore, can pro-
vide a borrower with access to credit/financing. Collateral can serve as an
inducement to lenders who would otherwise decide against lending to a
borrower.
But why crypto-collateral? Of all the different assets that a given bor-
rower may possess, why grant (or take) a security interest in a borrower’s
cryptocurrency? In short, for both lenders and borrowers, cryptocurrency is
viable as collateral (either alone or as part of a broader collateral package)
because of access and value.
1. Access to Crypto-Collateral
By access, the author means that cryptocurrency is increasingly com-
mon. Though far from ubiquitous, a growing number of individuals and firms
hold cryptocurrency. Its reach, both as an alternative method of payment and
15. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(48).
16. Id. § 9-102(a)(2).
17. Id. § 9-102(a)(33).
18. See supra notes 2–3.
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as means of speculative investment, has grown.19 It is no surprise that daily
cryptocurrency transaction volume has grown steadily since 2009 and re-
mains relatively strong in 2018.20 As such, potential borrowers are now more
likely to possess or hold cryptocurrency, making it a more readily available
form of collateral. This is evidenced by the growing number of users of
cryptocurrency,21 the proliferation of new types of cryptocurrency,22 and the
increased mainstream acceptance of and investment in cryptocurrency.23
In March 2017, a study by Dr. Farrick Hileman and Michel Rauchs at
the University of Cambridge Judge Business School estimated that unique
active users of cryptocurrencies wallets numbered between 2.9 million and
5.8 million.24 That number is growing, with some major cryptocurrency ex-
changes adding more than 1,000 users per day.25 In January 2018, the num-
ber of Bitcoin users alone had grown to between 13 million and 28.5 million
19. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 284–93; see also Initial Coin Offerings
(ICOs), U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/
ICO (noting that “[c]ompanies and individuals are increasingly considering ini-
tial coin offerings (ICOs) as a way to raise capital or participate in investment
opportunities.”).
20. See Bitcoin, Litecoin, Dogecoin Transactions Historical Chart, BITINFO-
CHARTS, https://bitinfocharts.com/comparison/transactions-btc-ltc-doge.html
(last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (showing historical transactions per day for several
different cryptocurrencies).
21. See generally Dr. Garrick Hileman & Michel Rauchs, Global Cryptocurrency
Benchmarking Study, UNIV. CAMBRIDGE (2017), https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/
faculty-research/centres/alternative-finance/publications/global-cryptocurrency/
#.W6CUOS3MzVq.
22. See COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all/ (last visited
Feb. 5, 2019) (listing over 2,000 different cryptocurrencies).
23. See, e.g., Chance Barnett, Inside the Meteoric Rise of ICOs, FORBES (Sept. 23,
2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2017/09/23/inside-the-me-
teoric-rise-of-icos/#31458efd5670; Sally Davies & Thomas Hale, Bitcoin Com-
pany Coinbase Lands 75M Investment from NYSE and BBVA, FIN. TIMES (Jan.
20, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/b6f63e4c-a0af-11e4-9aee-00144feab7
de; Shawn Knight, Dell Joins the Growing List of Major Retailers Now Ac-
cepting Bitcoins, TECHSPOT (July 18, 2014), https://www.techspot.com/news/
57461-dell-joins-the-growinglist-of-major-retailers-now-accepting-bitcoin
.html.
24. Hileman & Rauchs, supra note 21.
25. Joseph Young, Exponential Growth: Cryptocurrency Exchanges Are Adding
100,000+ Users Per Day, COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 7, 2018), https://cointelegraph
.com/news/exponential-growth-cryptocurrency-exchanges-are-adding-100000-
users-per-day.
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users.26 Some analysts have even predicted that the total number of
cryptocurrency users will exceed 200 million by 2024.27
The number of cryptocurrencies, like the number of users, has also
grown. Cryptocurrency is no longer just about Bitcoin. By some accounts,
over 2,000 different cryptocurrencies now exist.28 Of these cryptocurrencies,
twenty-three have a market cap of over at least $1 billion.29
Finally, cryptocurrency is becoming more mainstream. Cryptocurrency
is now accepted as a form of payment by many well-known merchants, in-
cluding Dell,30 Expedia,31 Overstock.com,32 and Microsoft.33 Even the Sacra-
mento Kings basketball team will accept bitcoin for tickets, jerseys, and
concessions.34 Cryptocurrency, therefore, is increasingly accepted for both
online and brick-and-mortar purchases.35 In addition, cryptocurrency is
viewed by some as ripe for speculative investment.36 Despite the risk, the
26. Alex Lielacher, How Many People Use Bitcoin? Updated for 2018, BITCOIN
MARKET J. (July 31, 2018), https://www.bitcoinmarketjournal.com/how-many-
people-use-bitcoin/.
27. Joseph Young, Exponential Growth: Number of Bitcoin Users to Reach 200
Million by 2024, CCN (Dec. 9, 2017), https://www.ccn.com/exponential-
growth-number-bitcoin-users-reach-200-million-2024/.
28. See COINMARKETCAP, supra note 22.
29. COINMARKETCAP, supra note 22.
30. See Sydney Temper, Dell Begins Accepting Bitcoin, N.Y. TIMES (July 18,
2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/dell-begins-accepting-bit
coin/.
31. See Jane Genova, Expedia Accepts Bitcoin—Why?, PAYMENTWEEK (June 18,
2014), https://paymentweek.com/2014-6-18-expedia-accepts-bitcoin-why-
4923/; Knight, supra note 23.
32. See Cade Metz, Overstock.com Becomes First Major Retailer to Accept Bitcoin
Worldwide, WIRED (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/09/over
stock-com-becomes-first-major-retailer-accept-bitcoin-worldwide/.
33. See Aaron Smith, Microsoft Begins Accepting Bitcoin, CNN (Dec. 11, 2014),
https://money.cnn.com/2014/12/11/technology/microsoft-bitcoin/index.html.
34. See Michael J. Casey, Sacramento Kings to Accept Bitcoin, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
16, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sacramento-nba-team-to-accept-bit
coin-1389884367?tesla=y.
35. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 285–91.
36. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 292–93; see also Ellen Chang, Is Bitcoin a
Safe Investment?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (May 4, 2018), https://
money.usnews.com/investing/cryptocurrency/articles/2018-05-04/is-bitcoin-a-
safe-investment; Ruth Umoh, 19-year-old Bitcoin Millionaire: Here’s How
Much You Should Invest in Cryptocurrencies, CNBC (Feb. 2, 2018), https://
www.cnbc.com/2018/02/02/bitcoin-millionaire-says-this-is-how-much-to-in-
vest-in-cryptocurrency.html; Seven Questions to Ask Before Investing in
Cryptocurrency, FORBES (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
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potential for significant returns has attracted investors.37 Cryptocurrency in-
vesting, however, has expanded beyond attempts to simply buy low and sell
high. Investors can now participate in investment opportunities known as “in-
itial coin offerings” (ICOs), a means of raising capital from interested inves-
tors in exchange for “tokens” issued on a blockchain.38 According to
Coindesk, ICOs have raised $6.3 billion in the first quarter of 2018 (approxi-
mately 118% of the over $5 billion raised by ICOs in all of 2017).39
To be clear, the foregoing description of cryptocurrency’s rise is not
offered as an endorsement. Instead, it serves a very limited purpose: to high-
light that cryptocurrency is no longer a novelty or mere curiosity. As such, in
the context of secured transactions, lenders are much more likely to encoun-
ter a borrower with cryptocurrency assets. Lenders who are seeking assets to
secure a lending obligation increasingly find borrowers (both individuals and
business entities) willing to pledge their cryptocurrency as collateral. The
prevalence of cryptocurrency as an asset makes cryptocurrency potentially
useful as collateral.
2. Value of Crypto-Collateral
As collateral, cryptocurrency is also useful because of its value. For
example, in December 2017, Bitcoin reached a high of nearly 20,000 U.S.
dollars for a single bitcoin.40 Even after dropping in value, Bitcoin’s market
forbesfinancecouncil/2018/03/30/seven-questions-to-ask-before-investing-in-
cryptocurrency/#31324e049d0a.
37. See supra note 36.
38. See Izabella Kaminska & Paul Murphy, Bitcoin’s Surge Fuels Fears of Asset
Bubble, FIN. TIMES (May 14, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/ce3ef54e-
371b-11e7-bce4-9023f8c0fd2e; Richard Kastelein, What Initial Coin Offerings
Are, and Why VC Firms Care, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Mar. 24, 2017), https://
hbr.org/2017/03/what-initial-coin-offerings-are-and-why-vc-firms-care; Alex
Wilhelm, WTF is an ICO?, TECHCRUNCH (2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/
05/23/wtf-is-an-ico/; The Market in Initial Coin Offerings Risks Becoming a
Bubble, ECONOMIST (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-
economics/2017/04/27/the-market-in-initial-coin-offerings-risks-becoming-a-
bubble.
39. David Floyd, $6.3 Billion: 2018 ICO Funding Has Passed 2017’s Total,
COINDESK (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/6-3-billion-2018-ico-
funding-already-outpaced-2017/.
40. See Bitcoin (USD) Price, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/price/ (last
visited Feb. 5, 2019); see also Stan Higgins, From $900 to $20,000: Bitcoin’s
Historic 2017 Price Run Revisited, COINDESK (Dec. 30, 2017 13:30 UTC),
https://www.coindesk.com/900-20000-bitcoins-historic-2017-price-run-revis-
ited/.
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capitalization still stands at over $128 billion, and a single bitcoin trades at
over $7,000.41
Bitcoin value, of course, is not necessarily indicative of the value of all
other cryptocurrencies. In fact, most cryptocurrency values pale in compari-
son to Bitcoin’s per coin price and market capitalization.42 Even so,
cryptocurrencies other than Bitcoin remain valuable. In May 2018, the mar-
ket capitalization of twenty-three different cryptocurrencies exceeded $1 bil-
lion.43 129 cryptocurrencies had a market capitalization of over $100 million,
and more than 475 cryptocurrencies had a market capitalization of over $10
million.44
Because collateral serves as a secondary source of repayment when a
borrower defaults,45 the value of collateral is paramount. But collateral of any
kind most effectively mitigates the risk of default if the value of the collateral
exceeds the amount of the secured obligation at the time of default.46 As
such, lenders typically seek to over-collateralize.47 By requiring over-col-
lateralization for financing, the lender mitigates the risk of diminished collat-
eral value—for example, if the collateral depreciates in value, is damaged or
destroyed, or is transferred in violation of a security agreement.48 Thus, the
lender lowers its exposure to risk of default.49
Cryptocurrency, therefore, provides lenders with a means of adding col-
lateral value. Lenders may seek a pledge of cryptocurrency assets as all or
part of the collateral for a secured loan. As such, one can view cryptocur-
rency as another asset for purposes of credit enhancement. Absent a pledge
of cryptocurrency, a borrower may lack assets of sufficient value to obtain a
loan. Even if the borrower has other assets of value, lenders may very well
seek to add a pledge of cryptocurrency to further mitigate the risk of de-
41. See Bitcoin (USD) Price, supra note 40 (listing the price of Bitcoin as of May
28, 2018); Top 100 Cryptocurrencies by Market Capitalization, COINMARKET-
CAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (listing the market
capitalization of Bitcoin on May 28, 2018).
42. See Top 100 Cryptocurrencies, supra note 41 (For example, Ethereum—the
second most valuable cryptocurrency—traded at $567.89 and had a market
capitalization of over $55 billion on May 28, 2018).
43. See Top 100 Cryptocurrencies, supra note 41.
44. See Top 100 Cryptocurrencies, supra note 41.
45. See U.C.C. § 9-610 (giving secured creditors the right to sell or otherwise dis-
pose of collateral following default); see also id. § 9-615 (providing for the
application of sale proceeds to satisfy the obligation secured by the collateral).
46. See supra note 45.
47. See Overcollateralization–OC, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/




fault.50 In that regard, the value of cryptocurrency collateral may facilitate the
extension of credit.
It is also worth noting that the ability to quickly and efficiently convert
the value of cryptocurrency into cash may add to its attractiveness as collat-
eral. Although many cryptocurrencies are not exchange-traded, cryptocur-
rency exchanges (like Bitpanda, Bitstamp, Coinbase, and Kraken) facilitate
the purchase and sale of some of the most popular cryptocurrencies.51 Be-
cause of this, the value of listed cryptocurrencies (such as Bitcoin, Ethereum,
Litecoin, and Ripple) can be converted to cash.52 Therefore, lenders may ben-
efit from the existence of a market for selling some types of crypto-collateral
after a default. Despite liquidity problems,53 the presence of established
cryptocurrency exchanges may make it easier and less costly for lenders to
locate interested buyers. In addition, cryptocurrencies (unlike other types of
collateral, like equipment) do not need to be prepared or maintained by the
lender in advance of a sale, which also reduces the costs of holding an Article
9 sale.54
In short, cryptocurrencies may constitute a viable piece of collateral in
secured lending transactions because cryptocurrencies are increasingly com-
mon. In addition, they are valuable assets that, in many cases, can be easily
converted into cash by a lender upon default. Because of these attributes,
lenders may seek cryptocurrency as collateral from borrowers who possess it.
In turn, borrowers with cryptocurrency hold an asset that is valuable and
potentially useful as collateral in an effort to obtain financing from a lender.
50. See Tu, supra note 2, at 556–57.
51. See Cherry Reynard, Is it Better to Buy or Trade Cryptocurrencies, TELEGRAPH
(May 25, 2018), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/digital-money/buy-
ing-vs-trading-cryptocurrency/; Yoav Vilner, Cryptocurrency Exchanges are
Getting Better in User Experience and Liquidity, FORBES (July 14, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/yoavvilner/2018/07/14/cryptocurrency-ex-
changes-are-getting-better-in-user-experience-and-liquidity/#7da42ee037f3;
Joseph Young, Volumes on Most Major Cryptocurrency Exchanges are Fake
or Inflated, COINTELEGRAPH (Mar. 20, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/
volumes-on-most-major-cryptocurrency-exchanges-are-fake-or-inflated-study;
Liquidity Problems – One of the Biggest in Current Cryptocurrency Ex-
changes, MEDIUM (June 26, 2018), https://medium.com/@enbofficial/liquidity-
problems-one-of-the-biggest-in-current-cryptocurrency-exchanges-b5aeaa4446
a6; Mechanisms for Creating Liquidity on the Cryptocurrency Markets, ME-
DIUM (Jan. 22, 2018), https://medium.com/@evenfoundation/mechanisms-for-
creating-liquidity-on-the-cryptocurrency-markets-6f67550c8649.
52. See, e.g., BITPANDA, https://www.bitpanda.com/en (last visited Feb. 5, 2019);
BITSTAMP, https://www.bitstamp.net/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019); COINBASE,
https://www.coinbase.com/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019); KRAKEN, https://www
.kraken.com/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
53. See supra note 51.
54. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 282–83.
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3. Challenges of Crypto-Collateral
Despite the attributes that make it useful as collateral, cryptocurrency
admittedly presents lenders with challenges and risks. The most significant of
these challenges center on the effect of price volatility and the risk of loss,
which may reduce the value of a lender’s collateral. Accordingly, lenders
may need to take steps to mitigate the risks associated with declining collat-
eral value when crypto-collateral is involved.
The price of cryptocurrency is notoriously volatile. In fact, Bitcoin’s
brief history is peppered with major crashes and recoveries.55 On more than
one occasion, Bitcoin’s value has dropped by over thirty percent.56 In April
2013, the value of Bitcoin dropped an astounding seventy-one percent over-
night.57 More recently, the value of a single Bitcoin rose from around $1,000
in January 2017 to nearly $20,000 in December 2017.58 The price of a single
bitcoin has since dropped to $7,418.99 on May 29, 2018.59
An in-depth examination of the reasons for each major price shock is
beyond the scope of this Article. However, the decline in value is often at-
tributed to the market’s reaction to external events such as government crack-
downs,60 major hacks or outages at exchanges,61 and sell-offs of large
quantities of cryptocurrency.62 Regardless of the reasons, price volatility is a
reality of cryptocurrency, and it has a direct impact on the use of cryptocur-
rency as collateral in secured lending transactions.
In an ideal secured loan, the lender never resorts to repossession and
sale of the collateral. Rather, the borrower abides by the terms of the loan
55. See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, An Illustrated History of Bitcoin Crashes, FORBES
(Apr. 11, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2013/04/11/an-illus-
trated-history-of-bitcoin-crashes/#11e9890b4039; Jeff John Roberts, 5 Big
Bitcoin Crashes: What We Learned, FORTUNE (Sept. 18, 2017), http://fortune
.com/2017/09/18/bitcoin-crash-history/.
56. See Roberts, supra note 55.
57. Roberts, supra note 55.
58. Bitcoin (USD) Price, supra note 40; see also Tu, supra note 2, at 516.
59. Bitcoin (USD) Price, supra note 40.
60. See Roberts, supra note 55 (attributing a price drop in the summer of 2017 to
China’s crackdown on initial coin offerings and rumors of a government ban on
cryptocurrency trading).
61. Roberts, supra note 55 (attributing a seventy-one percent overnight price drop
to an outage at Mt. Gox—the largest exchange for buying and selling bitcoin at
the time).
62. See Joseph Young, Bitcoin Drops to $8,300 as Mt. Gox Trustee Sell Off Con-
tinues, Market Drops, CCN (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.ccn.com/bitcoin-
drops-8300-mt-gox-trustee-sell-off-continues-market-drops/ (attributing a
$2,300 drop in Bitcoin’s price over a 48-hour period to the sale of 40,000
bitcoins by the Mt. Gox Trustee).
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and repays the entirety of the secured obligation. However, if a default oc-
curs, the lender may have no alternative other than repossession and sale of
collateral.63 If the proceeds of the sale exceed the outstanding obligation,
then all is well. The lender applies the sale proceeds to satisfy the secured
obligation.64 But if the proceeds of the sale are insufficient then the lender
may not be repaid in full.65
Crypto-collateral, therefore, poses a challenge. The value of cryptocur-
rency is neither stable nor predictable. Unlike assets that have a steady depre-
ciation rate, crypto-collateral may quickly lose value. On the other hand,
lenders may benefit to the extent that crypto-collateral increases in value. To
be fair, the challenge of price volatility is not unique to crypto-collateral.
Other types of collateral, like stocks and commoditites, also suffer from price
fluctuations.66 Nevertheless, mitigating the risk of a decrease in crypto-collat-
eral value is important for lenders who opt to take a security interest in
cryptocurrency. Lenders may need to account for the potential of a price
decrease in assessing collateral value at the onset of a secured loan involving
cryptocurrency. For example, lenders may mitigate some of the risk by over-
collateralizing and requiring other types of collateral instead of relying solely
on crypto-collateral. Lenders who do so may be better positioned in the event
of a decrease in the price of cryptocurrency.
Beyond price volatility, crypto-collateral presents challenges related to
the risk of unauthorized transfer, theft, and loss. Again, these issues are not
unique to crypto-collateral. All types of collateral are susceptible to unautho-
rized transfer, theft, and loss. However, attributes of cryptocurrency may
heighten the risk.67 Cryptocurrency transactions are described as both irre-
versible68 and pseudonymous.69 In the context of collateral, these attributes
may impede or prevent repossession and sale by the lender. Consider, for
example, cryptocurrency that is stolen or lost to hackers or cryptocurrency
that is transferred by the borrower in violation of the terms of the security
agreement. Since the transaction is irreversible, the person who is now in
control of the cryptocurrency—the hackers or transferee—would need to ini-
63. See U.C.C. §§ 9-609, 9-610(a).
64. See id. § 9-615(a).
65. See id. § 9-615(d).
66. See, e.g., Loan Stock, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/
loan_stock.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
67. See Martinson & Masterson, supra note 2; see also Tu, supra note 2, at 544,
557.
68. See Some Things You Need to Know, BITCOIN.ORG, https://bitcoin.org/en/you-
need-to-know (last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (“Any transaction issued with Bitcoin
cannot be reversed, they can only be refunded by the person receiving the
funds.”).
69. See Brito & Castillo, supra note 1, at 10–12.
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tiate a new transaction to return the cryptocurrency.70 In addition, the pseu-
donymous nature of cryptocurrency transactions means that personally
identifiable information, such as the name of the transferee, is not associated
with the transaction.71 This makes it more difficult and costly for lenders to
identify the person now in possession of the crypto-collateral.72
Because of these attributes, lenders may seek to mitigate the risk by
taking additional steps when crypto-collateral is involved. For example, lend-
ers could take affirmative steps to prevent the borrower from transferring
crypto-collateral. Instead of relying solely upon contractual prohibitions
against transfer, lenders could require that the borrower transfer crypto-col-
lateral to a wallet controlled by the lender.73 Doing so would prevent the
borrower from using or transferring crypto-collateral without the lender’s
knowledge and agreement. In addition, lenders may resort to overcollateral-
ization and require collateral other than cryptocurrency.74 Doing so may pro-
vide lenders with sufficient collateral in the event of theft, loss, or
unauthorized transfer of crypto-collateral.
Ultimately, the risks and challenges of cryptocurrency do not appear to
render it useless as collateral. Though the characteristics of crypto-collateral
may present heightened concerns about lost collateral value, lenders can take
steps to mitigate the risk. Therefore, the value of cryptocurrency can be, and
is, used to provide additional security in lending transactions.
B. Examples of Cryptocurrency Collateralization
Having concluded that cryptocurrency is potentially viable as collateral,
Part II.B highlights how cryptocurrency collateral is used in secured lending
today. The use of crypto-collateral, therefore, is neither a fantasy nor a pre-
diction for the future. Rather, it is already a reality of secured lending both in
the United States and abroad.
The most obvious example is a lender that affirmatively seeks a pledge
of cryptocurrency from a potential borrower. Given the value of cryptocur-
rency and the lenders own risk-tolerance, some lenders may agree to provide
a loan to borrowers that pledges cryptocurrency as all or part of the collateral
for the obligation to repay. Major financial institutions have yet to uniformly
70. See Some Things You Need to Know, supra note 68.
71. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 291; see also Brito & Castillo, supra note
1, at 10–12.
72. See Tu, supra note 2, at 556; see also Brito & Castillo, supra note 1, at 10–12
(discussing methods of deanonymization); Bitcoin Transactions Aren’t as
Anonymous as Everyone Hoped, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 23, 2017), https://
www.technologyreview.com/s/608716/bitcoin-transactions-arent-as-anony-
mous-as-everyone-hoped/ (discussing means of linking Bitcoin transactions to
individuals).
73. See Tu, supra note 2, at 556; see also Mann supra note 10.
74. See Tu, supra note 2, at 557.
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accept cryptocurrency as collateral.75 However, interest in crypto-collateral
lending is growing among others, including a group of startups in the busi-
ness of originating loans secured by cryptocurrency.76
But even if a lender is not actively seeking to obtain a security interest
in a borrower’s cryptocurrency, there are still many instances in which
crypto-collateral will be implicated. Consider the following examples. First,
lenders commonly seek to obtain an “all assets” security interest that covers
all of the borrower’s personal property.77 As a result, an “all assets” security
interest granted by any borrower who holds cryptocurrency will necessarily
involve crypto-collateral. Second, lenders frequently obtain a security inter-
est that covers after-acquired property.78 Third, Article 9 of the U.C.C. pro-
vides that a security interest in original collateral also includes a security
interest over any identifiable proceeds.79 So, if a borrower sells or trades any
original collateral for cryptocurrency, then the cryptocurrency is proceeds,80
and the lender’s security interest includes crypto-collateral.81
Finally, the growth of cryptocurrency has given rise to a group of new
startups with a business model based entirely on the offering “crypto-se-
75. See Evelyn Cheng, Major Wall Street Analyst: Here’s What Needs to Happen
for the Bitcoin Boom to Keep Going, CNBC (July 24, 2017), https://www.cnbc
.com/2017/07/24/this-needs-to-happen-to-keep-bitcoin-boom-going-bank-of-
america.html.
76. See, e.g., M. Sandra Appel, Can You Take a Security Interest in Bitcoin, DLA
PIPER PUBL’NS (May 7, 2014), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/canada/insights/
publications/2014/05/can-you-take-a-security-interest-in-bitcoin; Olaga Kharif,
These Guys Want to Lend You Money Against Your Bitcoin, BLOOMBERG (Dec.
13, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-14/bitcoin-s-
new-barons-no-longer-have-to-sell-to-live-in-luxury (discussing SALT Lend-
ing, Nebeus, CoinLoan, and EthLend); Martinson & Masterson, supra note 2;
Riley, supra note 2; Ryan, supra note 3 (discussing Unchained Capital);
Southurst, supra note 3; Young, supra note 2.
77. See, e.g., Barbara M. Goodstein, Collateral Descriptions and Blanket Liens: Is
the Kitchen Sink Enough?, N.Y.L.J. (June 4, 2015), https://www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/almID/1202728248480/?slreturn=20180818154052
(“Blanket or ‘all assets’ security interests are among the most common, if not
the most common, type of lien required of borrowers by secured lenders in
commercial transactions.”).
78. See U.C.C. § 9-204(a).
79. See id. §§ 9-102(a)(64), 9-315(a)(2).
80. Id.
81. Imagine, for example, a bike shop that grants a security interest in all bike
inventory to a bank. The bike shop sells the bike inventory—bikes, helmets,
and the like—to its customers. The bike shop accepts traditional payment
methods but also decides to accept Bitcoin. The bank’s security interest covers
the bike inventory as original collateral, but it also covers the payments re-
ceived by the bike shop, including the Bitcoin, as proceeds.
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cured” loans to borrowers.82 These startups differ from traditional secured
creditors who seek to fit crypto-collateral into their existing secured lending
practices. In contrast, these startups seek to provide enhanced liquidity to
holders of cryptocurrency assets by allowing owners to access the value of
their cryptocurrency without selling it.83 Unchained Capital (an Austin,
Texas based start-up) lends up to $1 million to individuals and businesses
who provide either Bitcoin or Ethereum as collateral.84 Unchained Capital,
however, is not alone in providing these types of loans.85 Denver-based
SALT Lending is another.86 SALT Lending provides liquidity to cryptocur-
rency holders by offering cash loans in exchange for a pledge of cryptocur-
rency or other blockchain assets.87 A different model for offering “crypto-
secured” loans is provided by Biterest, which provides a peer-to-peer plat-
form for borrowing and lending money secured with Bitcoin.88 Startups in
other countries, including Japan and China, also offer crypto-secured loans.89
The foregoing accentuates the growing prevalence of crypto-collateral
in secured lending transactions both in the United States and abroad. Crypto-
collateral is a present reality for those engaging in secured transactions.
Lenders and borrowers, therefore, must be attuned to the potential of
cryptocurrency serving as a form of credit enhancement in secured loans.
Moreover, those engaged in secured lending transactions must be aware of
the distinct ways that crypto-collateral may affect a secured lending transac-
tion, including the legal requirements for obtaining and maintaining an en-
forceable security interest in crypto-collateral.
82. See Kharif, supra note 76; Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Lessons From Case Study of
Secured Transactions with Bitcoin, 21 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2019); Ryan, supra note 3; Yackowicz, supra note 3; Unchained Capital
Announces Crypto-Secured Loans are Now Available to the Public, supra note
3.
83. See supra note 82.
84. See supra note 82.
85. See supra note 82.
86. See Jonathan Shieber, SALT Lending Offers Liquidity for Cryptocurrency Hold-
ers, TECHCRUNCH (May 2, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/05/02/salt-lend-
ing-offers-liquidity-for-cryptocurrency-holders/; SALT Lending, https://www
.saltlending.com/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
87. See supra note 86.
88. BITEREST, https://biterest.com/en/borrower (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
89. See Kevin Helms, Japanese Corporation Begins Offering Loans Secured by
Cryptocurrency, BITCOIN.COM, https://news.bitcoin.com/japanese-corporation-
loans-secured-cryptocurrency/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019); Southurst, supra note
3.
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III. A PRIMER ON CRYPTO-COLLATERAL UNDER ARTICLE 9
Given the growth of crypto-collateral, a general understanding of the
relevant legal framework for obtaining enforceable security interests in
cryptocurrency is necessary. To date, the basic consensus is that the existing
provisions of U.C.C. Article 9, while imperfect, can accommodate the use of
crypto-collateral.90 However, Article 9 does not recognize crypto-collateral
as a separate and distinct collateral type.91 Article 9 is flexible enough to
govern the practice by treating crypto-collateral within its currently defined
collateral type—most likely as a “general intangible.”92 Thus, all of the rules
for obtaining, maintaining, and enforcing a security interest in general in-
tangibles can be applied to crypto-collateral.93
A. Cryptocurrency as General Intangibles
Under Article 9 of the U.C.C., general intangibles exist as a broad
catch-all collateral type.94 If the collateral is personal property, and it does
not fall into one of the other collateral types defined by Article 9, then it is a
general intangible.95 Other U.C.C. collateral types, such as “money”96 and
90. See Timothy Bierer, Hashing it Out: Problems and Solutions Concerning
Cryptocurrency Used as Article 9 Collateral, 7 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. &
INTERNET 79 (2016); Reno F.R. Fernandez III, Can Bitcoin be Used as Collat-
eral to Secure a Loan?, BAR ASS’N S.F. (June 30, 2014), https://blog.sfbar.org/
2014/06/30/can-bitcoin-be-used-as-collateral-to-secure-a-loan/; Fogg, supra
note 7; Mann, supra note 10; Lance P. Martin, Can I Secure a Loan with
Bitcoin? Part I, NAT’L L. REV., 2018 WLNR 8331794 (Mar. 18, 2018); Jeanne
Schroeder, Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 U. MIA. BUS. L.
REV. 1, 8 (2016); Jeffrey I. Snyder, Secured Lender Protection Limited When
Bitcoin is Collateral, NAT’L L. REV. (2014), WLNR 16714205 (June 19, 2014);
Tu, supra note 2, at 557; Carl N. Wedoff, When Blockchain Meets Article 9
and Bankruptcy, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=b0bdad9f-eecd-4a7e-9491-b14d33af7c09; see also Appel, supra
note 76 (discussing security interests in cryptocurrency under Canadian law).
91. See U.C.C. § 1-201; see also id. § 9-102.
92. See id. § 9-102(a)(42); see also Tu, supra note 2, at 546–47; Fogg, supra note
7; Schroeder, supra note 90, at 8.
93. See Tu, supra note 2, at 554.
94. See U.C.C. §§ 9-102(a)(42), 9-102 cmt. 5.d (“‘General intangible’ is the
residual category of personal property, including things in action, that is not
included in the other defined types of collateral.”); Tu, supra note 2, at 547.
95. See supra note 94.
96. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(24) (defining “money” as a medium of exchange currently
authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign).
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“investment property”97 may seem potentially applicable to cryptocurrency.
After all, cryptocurrency is used for paying for goods and services as well as
for speculative investment.98 But neither the definition of “money” nor the
definition of “investment property” appears to fit cryptocurrency.
Cryptocurrency does not qualify as “money” under the U.C.C. for two
primary reasons. First, cryptocurrency is not tangible.99 It is entirely digital
and, therefore, lacks a physical form.100 In contrast, the U.C.C. treats
“money” as a moveable good that is capable of possession by a secured
party.101 In fact, the only way to perfect a security interest in money is via
possession by the secured party.102 Categorizing cryptocurrency as “money”
for purposes of the U.C.C., therefore, is inappropriate because it is intangi-
ble.103 Second, the definition of money is limited to a “medium of exchange
currently authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government.”104 A
number of foreign governments have started development of a state-backed
cryptocurrency or digital currency.105 Some have even launched a govern-
ment-backed cryptocurrency.106 Venezuela’s Petro, for example, is backed by
97. Id. § 9-102(a)(49) (defining “investment property” as “a security, whether cer-
tificated or uncertificated, security entitlement, securities account, commodity
contract, or commodity account”).
98. See Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency,
and the Case Against its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 127–28
(2012); James Surowiecki, Cryptocurrency: The Bitcoin, a Virtual Medium of
Exchange, Could Be a Real Alternative to Government-Issued Money—But
Only If It Survives Hoarding by Speculators, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 23, 2011),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/425142/cryptocurrency/.
99. See Schroeder, supra note 90, at 11; Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 277; Brito
& Castillo, supra note 1, at 7.
100. See supra note 99.
101. See U.C.C. §§ 9-312(b)(3), 9-313(a).
102. See id. § 9-313(a).
103. See Schroeder, supra note 90, at 19–20.
104. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(24).
105. See, e.g., Qin Chen, Next Stop in Cryptocurrency Craze: A Government-
Backed Coin, CNBC (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/30/
cryptocurrency-craze-springboards-government-backed-coin.html; Mike
Orcutt, Governments Are Testing Their Own Cryptocurrencies, MIT TECH.
REV. (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608910/govern-
ments-are-testing-their-own-cryptocurrencies/; David Tweed, Why Govern-
ments Might Join the Cryptocurrency Craze, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-12/why-governments-
might-join-the-cryptocurrency-craze-quicktake.
106. Roger Aitken, Does Venezuela’s Oil-Backed ‘Petro’ Have the Power to Show-
case National Cryptocurrencies?, FORBES (May 31, 2018), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/rogeraitken/2018/05/31/does-venezuelas-oil-backed-petro-have-the-
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a barrel of crude oil.107 Most cryptocurrencies, however, are not authorized or
adopted by a government.108 As a result, a government-backed cryptocur-
rency, like the Venezuelan Petro, could ostensibly qualify as a government-
authorized or -approved medium of exchange. But many cryptocurrencies,
including popular ones like Bitcoin, would not fit the existing U.C.C. defini-
tion of money because they are not money.109
Cryptocurrency also fails to fit neatly within the category of “invest-
ment property,” which the U.C.C. defines as “a security, whether certificated
or uncertificated, security entitlement, securities account, commodity con-
tract, or commodity account.”110 Because Article 9 does not define the term
“security,” the federal securities laws are useful in considering what qualifies
as such. The definition of “security” is virtually identical in both the 1933
and 1934 Acts.111 Unless the context requires otherwise, the term “security”
means:
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based
swap, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas or other mineral
royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate or deposit for a security, any
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege or any security, certificate
power-to-showcase-national-cryptocurrencies/#4c24a05f7b43; Rachelle
Krygier, Venezuela Launches the ‘Petro,’ its Cryptocurrency, WASH. POST
(Feb. 20 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/
02/20/venezuela-launches-the-petro-its-cryptocurrency/?noredirect=on&utm_
term=.4586138d6250; Corina Pons & Girsih Gupta, The Petro, Venezuela’s
Oil-Backed Cryptocurrency, Raised $735 Million, Government Says, BUS. IN-
SIDER (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/r-venezuela-says-
launch-of-petro-cryptocurrency-raised-735-million-2018-2.
107. See Brito & Castillo, supra note 1, at 6 (noting that the value of cryptocurrency
is not derived from gold or a government).
108. See Lawless, supra note 7; Schroeder, supra note 90, at 19–20; Tu, supra note
2, at 547–48; but see Jake Adelstein & Sam Namezie, Is Bitcoin Legal Tender
in Japan?, SEEKING ALPHA (Dec. 24, 2017), https://seekingalpha.com/article/
4133681-bitcoin-legal-tender-japan (discussing claims that Japan’s Virtual
Currency Act gives bitcoin legal tender status); ADVISORY—References to
Bitcoin as ‘Legal Tender’ in Japan, REUTERS (Dec. 13, 2017), https://uk.reuters
.com/article/idUKL3N1OD35L (confirming that references to bitcoin as legal
tender in several Reuters stories were incorrect and clarifying that bitcoin can
be used as a legally accepted form of payment).
109. See supra note 103.
110. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(49).
111. ROBERT H. ROSENBLUM, INVESTMENT COMPANY DETERMINATION UNDER THE
1940 ACT: EXEMPTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 29–30 (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 2d ed.
2003).
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of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange
relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument com-
monly known as a “security”; or any certificate of interest or par-
ticipation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing;
but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange,
or banker’s acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issu-
ance not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or
any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.112
The Supreme Court has described the definition as “quite broad.”113 Fur-
ther, in considering scope, the Supreme Court stated that the definition was
intended to include “the many types of instruments that in our commercial
world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.”114 As a result, the defi-
nition includes “ordinary stocks and bonds, along with the ‘countless and
variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of money of others on
the promise of profits . . .’”115
Although cryptocurrency itself is not a stock or bond, certain cryptocur-
rency transactions could be characterized as a scheme devised by those who
seek to use the money of others on the promise of profits. As such, some
cryptocurrency uses may fall within the broadly inclusive definition of a se-
curity, likely as an “investment contract” under the Howey test.116 However,
it appears unlikely that cryptocurrency would constitute a security in all
cases.
Consider the following transactions involving cryptocurrency: (1) a per-
son who obtains cryptocurrency by mining; (2) a person who sells valuable
goods of services in exchange for cryptocurrency; (3) a person who
purchases cryptocurrency from an exchange to use it as a method of pay-
ment; (4) a person who purchases cryptocurrency from an exchange to hold
and trade it as an investment; (5) a person who invests in an ICO. Each of the
foregoing highlights a different type of cryptocurrency transaction with dis-
tinct methods of distribution and objectives. Some of these transactions, for
example those that plainly involve the investment of money and profit seek-
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (West 2010); see also id. § 77b(a)(1) (defining the term
“security” for purposes of the Securities Act of 1933).
113. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982).
114. Id. at 555–56.
115. Id. at 556.
116. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946)
(establishing that an investment contract is “a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to ex-
pect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”).
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ing, appear more likely to meet the definition of a security. However, the
other transactions do not appear to fit the same mold. It seems, then, that
cryptocurrency can constitute a security under certain circumstances, but it is
not always a security.
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) view of cryptocur-
rency lends credence to the conclusion above. The SEC has expressly ac-
knowledged that “there are cryptocurrencies that do not appear to be
securities.”117 More recently, SEC officials have stated they do not view
Bitcoin and Ethereum as securities.118 As such, they should not be regulated
as securities.119 However, ICOs almost always constitute securities.120 In the
SEC’s view, then, the question of whether a cryptocurrency is a security will
depend on its characteristics and use.121
The implication for the categorization of cryptocurrency under Article 9
is relatively clear. Investment property as a collateral type does not appear to
fully encompass cryptocurrency. Investment property is limited, by defini-
tion, to securities and the like.122 Notwithstanding the broad concept of “se-
curities” under federal securities law, only some applications of
cryptocurrency, namely, ICOs, will constitute a security. As a result, the Ar-
ticle 9 collateral category of “investment property” may not be applicable to
cryptocurrency held by a potential borrower.
Cryptocurrency, therefore, does not appear to fit fully into the existing
U.C.C. collateral types such as “money” and “investment property.”123 In
fact, cryptocurrency does not appear to fall within any of the other separately
defined collateral types except “general intangibles.”124 Article 9 basically
117. Chairman Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offer-
ings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, Statement on Potentially Unlawful Online Platforms for Trading
Digital Assets (Mar. 7, 2018) [hereinafter SEC Statement] (noting that online
platforms for trading digital assets, including coins, must register with the SEC
if the digital assets are securities).
118. Louise Matsakis, Rest Easy Cryptocurrency Fans: Ether and Bitcoin Aren’t
Securities, WIRED (June 14, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/sec-ether-
bitcoin-not-securities/.
119. See id.
120. See id.; see also Stan Higgins, SEC Chief Clayton: ‘Every ICO I’ve Seen is a
Security’, COINDESK (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/sec-chief-
clayton-every-ico-ive-seen-security/.
121. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 111.
122. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(49).
123. See Tu, supra note 2, at 547–50; but see Bierer, supra note 90, at 88–94 (sug-
gesting that cryptocurrency could arguably fit into existing concepts of money,
securities, and investment property).
124. See Fogg, supra note 7; Schroeder, supra note 90, at 30; Tu, supra note 2, at
546–47.
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defines “general intangibles” as a catch all or residual category of collat-
eral.125 The definition includes any intangible personal property other than
one of the separately listed Article 9 collateral types.126 Accordingly, the
U.C.C. is flexible enough to accommodate crypto-collateral by treating it as a
“general intangible” under the existing provisions of Article 9.127
B. Enforceable Security Interests Under Article 9
As discussed above, crypto-collateral does not currently exist as a sepa-
rate and distinct collateral type under the U.C.C.128 Instead, Article 9 is flexi-
ble enough to accommodate the practice of collateralizing cryptocurrency
within currently defined collateral types, most likely by treating it as a “gen-
eral intangible.”129 Accordingly, all of the rules that apply to the attachment,
perfection, priority, and enforcement of security interests in “general in-
tangibles,” would govern security interests in crypto-collateral.130 Moreover,
as noted by those who have examined the issue, Article 9’s treatment of
crypto-collateral as a “general intangible” has significant implications for
how to obtain and enforce a security interest under Article 9.131
For purposes of attaching an enforceable security interest in crypto-col-
lateral, a secured lender must comply with the requirements of section 9-
203.132 If crypto-collateral is treated as a “general intangible,” a lender only
obtains an enforceable security interest if: (1) the lender gives value to the
borrower; (2) the borrower has rights in the crypto-collateral; and (3) bor-
rower has authenticated a security agreement that describes the collateral.133
Section 9-203 provides alternatives to the third requirement.134 For certain
types of collateral, a lender may establish possession or control of the collat-
eral in lieu of obtaining an authenticated security agreement that describes
125. See Fogg, supra note 7; Schroeder, supra note 90, at 30; Tu, supra note 2, at
546–47.
126. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42).
127. See Fogg, supra note 7; Schroeder, supra note 90, at 30; Tu, supra note 2, at
546–47.
128. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201, 9-102.
129. See Fogg, supra note 7; Schroeder, supra note 90, at 30; Tu, supra note 2, at
546–47.
130. See Fogg, supra note 7; Schroeder, supra note 90, at 30; Tu, supra note 2, at
546–47.
131. See Fogg, supra note 7; Schroeder, supra note 90, at 30; Tu, supra note 2, at
546–47.
132. U.C.C. § 9-203.
133. Id. § 9-203(a)–(b).
134. Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(A)–(D).
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the collateral.135 However, “general intangibles” are not one of the listed
types of collateral capable of possession or control.136 As a result, attachment
of an enforceable security interest in crypto-collateral would require an au-
thenticated security agreement that describes the collateral.137
Likewise, perfection of a security interest in crypto-collateral would
generally require the filing of a valid UCC-1 financing statement.138 Again,
Article 9 provides special rules that provide alternative methods of perfecting
a security interest.139 However, these alternative methods of perfection only
apply to certain types of collateral.140 Article 9 authorizes control as a method
of perfection for chattel paper, deposit accounts, letter-of-credit rights, nego-
tiable documents, instruments, and investment property.141 Similarly, Article
9 recognizes possession as a method of perfection for tangible negotiable
documents, goods, instruments, money, and tangible chattel paper.142 Nota-
bly, the list of collateral types does not include “general intangibles.”143
Therefore, the alternative methods of perfection do not apply to crypto-col-
lateral, which leaves filing of a financing statement as the only viable path to
perfection.144
Because the concepts of control and possession do not apply to general
intangibles, the priority rules granting preference to secured lenders who per-
fect via these methods do not extend to crypto-collateral.145 Instead, priority
among competing security interests in the same crypto-collateral will be de-
termined by the default rules of Section 9-322.146
In short, the categorization of crypto-collateral as a “general intangible”
affects the process of obtaining and enforcing a security interest. The most
significant implication of treating crypto-collateral as a “general intangible”
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. § 9-203.
138. See U.C.C. §§ 9-308, 9-310.
139. See id. §§ 9-310, 9-312, 9-313.
140. Id.
141. Id. § 9-312(a)–(b).
142. Id. § 9-313(a).
143. Id.
144. See id. § 9-310(b); see also In re K-RAM, Inc., 451 B.R. 154, 173 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 2011) (“Perfection by possession applies only to tangible negotiable
documents, goods, instruments, money or tangible chattel paper. Perfection by
control applies only to investment property, deposit accounts, letter-of-credit
rights, electronic chattel paper and electronic documents.”); Fogg, supra note 7.
145. See Tu, supra note 2, at 547–49; see also U.C.C. §§ 9-327, 9-328, 9-329, 9-
330.
146. See Tu, supra note 2, at 547–49; see also U.C.C. § 9–322.
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is that the special rules relating to control and possession do not apply.147 If
this is the case, secured lenders must attach with an authenticated security
agreement and perfect by filing a financing statement.148 Using other meth-
ods of attachment and perfection may not create an enforceable security in-
terest in crypto-collateral.149 Moreover, to ensure priority over competing
perfected security interests, secured lenders must be the first to file or per-
fect.150 Article 9, therefore, is not specifically tailored to crypto-collateral,
but it nonetheless allows for the collateralization of cryptocurrency by cate-
gorizing it as a “general intangible.”151
IV. THE FUTURE OF CRYPTO-COLLATERAL AND ARTICLE 9
The ability to obtain an enforceable security interest in cryptocurrency
under Article 9 does not, however, mean that it is optimized for those who
seek to do so. Thus, the author has argued in his prior work that Article 9
does not yet provide a consistent and efficient process for those who engage
in secured transactions with crypto-collateral.152 Rather, it merely provides a
serviceable solution.153 Because of this, the author suggested that amending
Article 9 to recognize cryptocurrency as a newly defined collateral type may
be an appropriate step to take as commercial law evolves to address the
broader implications of cryptocurrency.154 Specifically, amending Article 9
would allow for the creation of rules tailored to the unique attributes of
crypto-collateral.155 Among other things, Article 9 could then extend the con-
cept of control to crypto-collateral, improving certainty in both the creation
and enforcement of security interest in cryptocurrency.156
From the perspective of improving the functionality of secured lending
transactions under Article 9, adding cryptocurrency as a new collateral type
holds some appeal.157 Doing so would likely benefit creditors and debtors
who now deal with crypto-collateral.158 However, providing a better process
for securing loans with cryptocurrency is only one of many considerations
147. See, e.g., §§ 9-203(b)(3)(A)–(D), 9-312, 9-313, 9-327, 9-328, 9-329, 9-330.
148. See Tu, supra note 2, at 545–47.
149. Tu, supra note 2, at 545–47.
150. Tu, supra note 2, at 547–48.
151. See Tu, supra note 2, at 541–42; Fogg, supra note 7; Schroeder, supra note 90,
at 30.
152. See Tu, supra note 2, at Part V.
153. Tu, supra note 2, at 573.
154. Tu, supra note 2, at 552.
155. Tu, supra note 2, at Part V.
156. Tu, supra note 2, at Part V.
157. Tu, supra note 2, at Part V.
158. See Tu, supra note 2, at Part V.
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relevant to the question of whether to amend Article 9. To date, the conversa-
tion has often centered on technical issues relating to the collateralization of
cryptocurrency under the U.C.C.159 Does Article 9 allow for the creation of
an enforceable security interest in cryptocurrency?160 If so, what are the best
practices for obtaining a valid and enforceable security interest in cryptocur-
rency?161 How could the U.C.C. be optimized for cryptocurrency
collateral?162
Instead of commenting further on how to optimize the U.C.C. for
crypto-collateral, the author seeks to expand the discussion. Article 9, as it
stands, is flexible enough to govern the use of cryptocurrency as collateral.163
However, it does not expressly contemplate crypto-collateral and is in no
way tailored to the nuances of crypto-collateral.164 As such, the U.C.C. could
be amended to improve Article 9 treatment of crypto-collateral.165 With this
foundation as the starting point, the author intends to begin examining the
broader question of whether Article 9 should be amended for crypto-collat-
eral. To be clear, the author does not endeavor to definitively answer this
question. Rather, he seeks to highlight that the question of whether to amend
Article 9 for crypto-collateral is complicated. The calculus involves more
than simply asking how to create a better or more sensible framework for
creditors and debtors who seek to use cryptocurrency as collateral.
Even though Article 9 treatment of crypto-collateral could be improved,
the determination of whether an amendment is appropriate implicates a di-
verse array of issues. As such, the gains in efficiency and certainty for those
engaged in secured transactions with crypto-collateral must be viewed in the
context of other considerations, including: (1) the uncertain future of
cryptocurrency; (2) the cost and difficulty of enacting a uniform amendment
to the U.C.C.; and (3) the potential impact of further normalizing the use of
159. See generally Bierer, supra note 90 (exploring cryptocurrency collateral under
existing Article 9 and suggesting possible revisions); Fogg, supra note 7 (criti-
quing Article 9’s treatment of cryptocurrency as general intangibles and sug-
gesting that they be re-categorized as investment property); Schroeder, supra
note 90 (examining Article 9’s treatment of cryptocurrency and the utility of
Article 8’s indirect ownership regime); Tu, supra note 2 (discussing best prac-
tices for collateralizing cryptocurrency under the existing provisions of Article
9 and setting forth a framework for amending Article 9 to recognize cryptocur-
rency as a new collateral type).
160. See supra note 159.
161. See supra note 159.
162. See supra note 159.
163. See supra note 159.
164. See supra note 159.
165. See Bierer, supra note 90, at Part V–VI; Fogg, supra note 7; Schroeder, supra
note 90; Tu, supra note 2, at Part V.A.
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cryptocurrency.166 Ultimately, the author suggests that an understanding of
all these issues should inform any decision on whether and when to amend
the U.C.C. for crypto-collateral.
A. Increased Certainty and Improved Functionality
The primary benefit of amending Article 9 is the potential for increased
efficiency and consistency in the U.C.C.’s treatment of crypto-collateral.
That is to say, amending Article 9 provides an opportunity to tailor provi-
sions specifically to crypto-collateral.167 In doing so, Article 9 could adopt a
framework that aligns with its treatment of similar collateral types, improv-
ing communication between parties and increasing certainty in the enforce-
ability of security interests in crypto-collateral.168 This would ostensibly
benefit those who currently seek to secure transactions with crypto-collateral
and establish a superior legal framework for the potentially growing number
of parties who will seek to use cryptocurrency as collateral in the future.
Article 9 is serviceable, but those who wish to obtain security interests
in cryptocurrency under current Article 9 face several challenges. One signif-
icant challenge is uncertainty as to the proper classification of cryptocurrency
under Article 9. As noted above, Article 9 does not separately recognize
crypto-collateral as a distinct collateral type.169 As a result, it is necessary to
fit crypto-collateral into a collateral type that is already defined in Article 9
(e.g., money, investment property, general intangible).170 Classification of
cryptocurrency, however, is complicated by the ongoing evolution of
cryptocurrency use and the development new types cryptocurrencies. For ex-
ample, ICOs appear to constitute a security under federal securities law, and
tokens acquired in an ICO could arguably qualify as investment property
under Article 9.171 But it does not appear that cryptocurrency will meet the
definition of a security in all cases (for example, Bitcoin or Ethereum held
directly).172 As a result, cryptocurrency that does not qualify as a security
would likely fit the definition of general intangibles under Article 9.173 In
166. See infra Parts III.B.–D.
167. See Tu, supra note 2, at 513.
168. See generally Tu, supra note 2, at Part V (discussing problems created by cur-
rent Article 9’s treatment of cryptocurrency and proposing the framework for
an amendment that could mitigate some of the issues currently faced by those
engaged in secured transactions with crypto-collateral).
169. U.C.C. §§ 1-201, 9-102.
170. See Bierer, supra note 90, at Part V–VI; Fogg, supra note 7; Lawless, supra
note 7; Schroeder, supra note 90; Tu, supra note 2, at Part V.A.
171. See supra notes 117–123 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 117–123 and accompanying text.
173. See Fogg, supra note 7; Schroeder, supra note 90, at 30; Tu, supra note 2, at
542.
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addition, the collateral type of “money” is potentially misleading. Cryptocur-
rency is used as a medium of exchange, and some governments have even
taken steps to develop and launch government-backed cryptocurrencies.174
However, cryptocurrency is intangible in nature. As a result, cryptocur-
rencies could be viewed as meeting some, but not all, of the requirements of
Article 9’s definition of money.175 Taken together, the classification of
cryptocurrency under Article 9 is murky at best. Article 9 certainly accom-
modates cryptocurrency within the definition of general intangibles. But the
extent to which cryptocurrency may fall within other Article 9 collateral
types is uncertain.
This uncertainty is potentially problematic in several respects. Failing to
properly classify cryptocurrency into an existing collateral type can lead to
adverse consequences for those engaged in secured transactions because it
impacts the permissible methods of attachment and perfection.176 Accord-
ingly, those who seek to obtain or pledge a security interest in crypto-collat-
eral may misclassify it under Article 9 and fail to properly attach or perfect.
In addition, uncertainty in the classification of crypto-collateral may impede
communication as to the scope of a security interest.177 Consider a security
agreement that describes the collateral using a collateral type defined by Arti-
cle 9—for example, consider a security agreement that grants a security in-
terest in all the debtor’s investment property or general intangibles. Although
Article 9 permits descriptions of this nature, a lack of clarity as to which
collateral type encompasses cryptocurrency may lead to disputes between a
creditor and debtor as to the scope of the security interest.178 The use of a
more specific description of the collateral may alleviate this risk.179 However,
the common practice of describing collateral by Article 9 collateral types
means that the lack of clarity as to the classification of crypto-collateral may
contribute to misunderstandings about the scope of a security interest be-
tween parties.180
Similarly, uncertainty in the classification of crypto-collateral may ad-
versely impact the notice filing system and communication among different
creditors.181 Consider a UCC-1 financing statement that describes the collat-
eral using a defined Article 9 collateral type. Again, the lack of clarity as to
the classification of crypto-collateral means that the use of an Article 9 col-
174. See supra notes 99–109 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 99–109 and accompanying text.
176. See Tu, supra note 2, at 545–47; Schroeder, supra note 90, at 9–10.
177. See Tu, supra note 2, at 68–71 (explaining how Article 9 could improve identi-
fication of crypto-collateral and notice of security interests in crypto-collateral).
178. U.C.C. § 9-108(b)(3).
179. See Tu, supra note 2, at 551.
180. Tu, supra note 2, at 551, 568–71.
181. Tu, supra note 2, at 551, 568–71.
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lateral type, such as investment property or general intangibles, may not ef-
fectively give notice to others about an existing security interest in the
debtor’s cryptocurrency.182 In short, Article 9’s classification of crypto-col-
lateral into an existing collateral type is not necessarily intuitive.183 It is not
clear to all that crypto-currency falls into a particular collateral type, and
interested parties may come to differing conclusions in classifying crypto-
collateral.184 Ultimately, this creates the potential for misunderstandings
about scope and subsequent disputes.
A related challenge for those engaged in secured transactions with
crypto-collateral under current Article 9 is the lack of a clear-cut method of
definitively establishing rights in crypto-collateral.185 The existing provisions
of Article 9 do provide a process for obtaining and enforcing a security inter-
est in crypto-collateral by treating it as a general intangible.186 But that pro-
cess is not tailored to crypto-collateral, and it fails to address the unique risks
of crypto-collateral.187 In addition, the process is inconsistent with how Arti-
cle 9 treats other types of collateral similar in nature to cryptocurrency, like
money and investment property.188
To the extent that crypto-collateral is treated as a general intangible
under current Article 9, the provisions relating to control do not apply.189
This is potentially problematic for several reasons. First, the risk of collateral
loss is exacerbated for secured creditors. Nothing prevents a borrower from
transferring crypto-collateral in violation of a security agreement.190 Once
this has occurred, the nature of cryptocurrency, specifically that transactions
are irreversible and without personally identifiable information about the re-
cipient, makes it difficult for a secured creditor to recover the collateral.191
Amending Article 9 to extend control to crypto-collateral minimizes this risk
because secured creditors would be incentivized to establish and maintain
control over crypto-collateral.192 By taking control—for example, by requir-
182. Tu, supra note 2, at 551, 568–71.
183. Tu, supra note 2, at 551, 568–71.
184. Tu, supra note 2, at 551, 568–71.
185. Tu, supra note 2, at 571–73.
186. Tu, supra note 2, at 551–56.
187. Tu, supra note 2, at 551–56.
188. Tu, supra note 2, at 551–66.
189. See supra Part II.B.
190. U.C.C. § 9-315(a).
191. See, e.g., Tu, supra note 2, at 51–52 (noting that secured creditors may resort to
steps outside of Article 9 of mitigate the increased risk of collateral loss and
unauthorized transfer, but also noting that amending Article 9 is another
option).
192. Tu, supra note 2, at 73.
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ing that borrowers transfer cryptocurrency to the secured creditor’s wallet—
the secured creditor would be in a better position to prevent unauthorized
transfers.193
Moreover, the lack of control may lead to secured creditors having less
certainty in the enforceability of a security interest in crypto-collateral.194 Be-
cause control does not apply to general intangibles, priority over cryptocur-
rency classified as such is determined by the first to file a UCC-1 financing
statement or perfect their security interest.195 While this process provides a
means of determining priority between creditors who both claim a security
interest in the same crypto-collateral, Article 9’s concept of control could
provide a more clear-cut method of establishing priority. Article 9 allows a
secured creditor to perfect a security interest in certain types of collateral by
taking control of the collateral.196 For certain types of collateral, a secured
creditor that perfects by control has priority over a secured creditor who per-
fects by other means, such as filing of a UCC-1 financing statement.197 If
more than one secured creditor establishes control over the collateral, the
first to do so has priority.198 As a result, control can provide greater assur-
ances of having priority in the event of debtor default. Specifically, the appli-
cability of control incentivizes secured creditors to investigate the status of
the collateral.199 Secured creditors may then proceed with greater certainty in
knowing that they are likely to obtain a first priority security interest, so long
as they properly establish and maintain control over the collateral in ques-
tion.200 Therefore, control provides a more clear-cut process for establishing
priority and rewards those who take the appropriate steps to take control of
collateral. Unfortunately, when cryptocurrency is classified as a general in-
tangible, secured creditors are unable to avail themselves of this process.
In sum, Article 9 provides a means for obtaining and enforcing security
interests in cryptocurrency. It accommodates crypto-collateral within the
breadth of presently defined collateral types. However, Article 9 could be
improved. Instead of simply forcing crypto-collateral into a framework that
never contemplated cryptocurrency, Article 9 could be amended to mitigate
or otherwise address some of the challenges facing those who now engage in
secured transactions with crypto-collateral. For example, Article 9 could be
amended to recognize crypto-collateral and definitively classify it, either by
adding crypto-collateral as a newly defined Article 9 collateral type or ex-
193. Tu, supra note 2, at 73.
194. Tu, supra note 2, at 71–73.
195. See supra Part II.B.
196. U.C.C. § 9-314.
197. See, e.g., id. §§ 9-327, 9-328.
198. Id.
199. See Tu, supra note 2, at Part V.D.2.
200. Tu, supra note 2, at Part V.D.2.
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panding the definition of an existing collateral type to expressly include
cryptocurrency.201 Such an amendment would eliminate uncertainty about the
proper classification of cryptocurrency under Article 9, improving the ability
of interested parties to communicate about the scope of a security interest
and minimizing the potential of misunderstandings.202 In addition, Article 9
could be amended to extend the concept of control to crypto-collateral.203
Doing so could provide a more effective and efficient process for obtaining
enforceable rights in crypto-collateral and establish priority in the case of
conflicting security interests over the same crypto-collateral.204
Ultimately, the question of how to amend Article 9 for cryptocurrency is
beyond the scope of this Article. The purpose of providing examples of pos-
sible amendments is to highlight that amending Article 9 provides an oppor-
tunity to tailor Article 9 to cryptocurrency and provide a more appropriate
legal framework for those who now use cryptocurrency as collateral. Thus,
the ability to better meet the needs of those engaged in secured transactions
with crypto-collateral is an important consideration in any decision to amend
Article 9. However, the ability to improve the functionality of Article 9 for
crypto-collateral and the benefits of doing so must be balanced against other
relevant considerations.
B. The Challenges of Enacting a Uniform Amendment
Any decision to amend Article 9 should also involve careful considera-
tion of the potential hurdles to enactment of a uniform amendment and the
likelihood of successfully doing so. The process of developing and enacting a
uniform amendment is no simple matter. Typically, it requires several years
and involves action by various groups, which may include the American Law
Institute (ALI), the Uniform Law Commission (ULC), and the legislatures of
over fifty jurisdictions.205 Accordingly, the enactment of a uniform amend-
ment to Article 9 could meet difficulties at several different junctures.
201. See Bierer, supra note 90; Fogg, supra note 7; Tu, supra note 2, at Part V.
202. See Tu, supra note 2, at Part V.
203. Tu, supra note 2, at Part V.
204. Tu, supra note 2, at Part V.
205. See generally Uniform Commercial Code UCC, AM. LAW INST. https://www
.ali.org/publications/show/uniform-commercial-code/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019)
(noting that the Permanent Editorial Board for the U.C.C. is a joint committee
of both the ALI and the ULC, which approves and promulgates amendments to
the U.C.C. when necessary); New Project Proposals, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://
www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=New%20Project%20Proposals
(last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (noting that a uniform or model act typically requires
one year of study and two years of drafting meetings); ULC Drafting Process,
UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=ULC%20
Drafting%20Process (last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (noting that after completion of
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Consider the first step of simply proposing a uniform amendment to
Article 9 as a new project for the ALI and ULC. The ALI and the ULC will
not approve all project proposals, so project approval presents an initial hur-
dle.206 The ALI’s process begins with the generation of project ideas by the
ALI Director and Projects Committee.207 After investigation and develop-
ment of project proposal, the Projects Committee provides a recommendation
to the ALI Council, which must then approve the project before drafting
commences.208
In contrast, the ULC solicits proposals for new study and drafting
projects twice a year.209 The ULC Committee on Scope and Program (the
Committee) must make a determination on whether the subject merits con-
sideration by the ULC.210 In making a determination, the Committee may
consider a number of questions, including the following:
• Is uniformity of state law for the proposed subject matter desirable
and realistic?
• Would widespread enactment of the proposal produce significant
benefits to the public?
• Will the proposed project facilitate the flow of commercial and other
transactions across state lines?
• Will the proposed project reduce or eliminate conflicts of laws aris-
ing when the law of more than one state might apply?
• Will the proposed project fill an emergent need, modernize an anti-
quated concept, or codify the common law?
• What have states already done with regard to the subject matter of
the proposed project?211
Even if the Committee decides to make an affirmative recommendation, the
ULC’s Executive Committee must still approve the proposal before assigning
it to a study committee or drafting committee.212
Even if the ALI and ULC decide to move forward with a proposal to
amend Article 9 for crypto-collateral, the ensuing process could take several
drafting, commissioners must advocate for adoption in their home
jurisdictions).
206. How the Institute Works, AM. LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/about-ali/how-
institute-works/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See New Project Proposals, supra note 205.
210. See New Projects Criteria, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/
projects/overview/newprojectcriteria (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
211. See New Project Proposals, supra note 205.
212. See New Projects Criteria, supra note 210.
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years.213 This often entails more than simply drafting the final text of a uni-
form amendment for promulgation to the states. The process often requires
the identification and involvement of subject matter experts and interested
groups (e.g., industry groups, consumer advocates, and consumer credit rep-
resentatives) to help produce balanced, enactable legislation.214 In addition,
the ULC may form a committee to conduct research and determine whether
drafting should commence.215 According to the ULC, the development of a
uniform act generally needs a minimum of one year of study and two years
of drafting meetings.216 When completed, a draft amendment is then submit-
ted to the entire ULC for debate and approval.217
The process of enacting a uniform amendment does not end there. ULC
approval simply means that the act has been officially adopted as either a
Uniform Act or a Model Act.218 The ULC then promulgates the act for con-
sideration by each of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
and the U.S. Virgin Islands.219 Although the ULC may advocate for adoption,
the last step is convincing the legislature of each jurisdiction to enact the
uniform legislation.220 Absent widespread adoption, the introduction of an
amendment to better accommodate crypto-collateral could ultimately under-
mine the goal of uniformity across jurisdictions.
As applied to a crypto-collateral focused amendment to Article 9, it
seems fair to question whether there would be sufficient support from the
ALI, ULC, and state legislatures. Consider, for example, the initial step of
submitting a proposal to amend Article 9 for crypto-collateral. As described
above, ULC approval depends on several factors.221 Many of these factors do
not clearly weigh in favor of moving forward with drafting of a uniform
amendment.
On the one hand, widespread enactment of a crypto-collateral amend-
ment for Article 9 would arguably provide significant benefits to the public,
especially the growing number of people who now seek to use crypto-collat-
213. See New Project Proposals, supra note 205; see also David Frisch, The Recent
Amendments to UCC Article 9: Problems and Solutions, 45 RICH. L. REV. 1009
(noting approval of the final text of revised Article 9 took eight years).
214. See New Project Proposals, supra note 205.
215. See New Projects Criteria, supra note 210.
216. See New Project Proposals, supra note 205.
217. See ULC Drafting Process, supra note 205 (explaining that a draft act must be
considered section by section, at no less fewer than two annual meetings by all
commissioners sitting as a Committee of the Whole, and noting that after ap-
proval, the final test is a vote by the states).
218. ULC Drafting Process, supra note 205.
219. ULC Drafting Process, supra note 205.
220. ULC Drafting Process, supra note 205.
221. See New Project Proposals, supra note 205.
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eral in secured transactions.222 In addition, optimizing Article 9 for crypto-
collateral would seemingly facilitate the flow of commercial transactions
across state lines by providing a more efficient and consistent means of en-
forcing security interests in cryptocurrency.223 Further, amending Article 9 to
expressly recognize crypto-collateral would modernize the U.C.C. by incor-
porating an emergent type of collateral.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the public benefit of such an amend-
ment is difficult to quantify. In theory, optimizing Article 9 for crypto-collat-
eral would improve certainty and enforceability of security interests. But
despite being sub-optimal, current Article 9 has not been the subject of wide-
spread complaint. There has been no uproar or demand for change from those
who must deal with crypto-collateral under current Article 9. Moreover, it
does not appear that any state or jurisdiction has taken any affirmative step
toward amending Article 9 for crypto-collateral. Accordingly, it is reasonable
to take the position that amending Article 9 would result in little, if any,
public benefit, and have little, if any, positive impact on facilitating the flow
of commercial transactions across state lines. Stated simply, current Article 9
is not perfect, but it is working well enough. As such, there may be no press-
ing need or problem to remedy.
Moreover, the lack of any state-specific legislation to address crypto-
collateral may weigh against approval to proceed with further study and
drafting of a uniform amendment. If no state has acted to adopt state-specific
legislation, then the goal of reducing or eliminating conflicts is not served.
That is, the foundational objective of attaining uniformity does not justify the
promulgation of a uniform amendment.
The dearth of legislative action to address Article 9’s treatment of
crypto-collateral is also potentially indicative of a lack of interest in taking
up the issue at the state level. Ultimately, the reason or reasons for the lack of
legislative will is irrelevant. It may stem from disinterest or lack of resources.
It may arise from the belief that crypto-collateral is not sufficiently ubiqui-
tous or that there is simply no significant problem with Article 9 as it stands.
It may come from simple resistance to anything new or a misunderstanding
about cryptocurrency and its impact on secured transactions. In the end, it
does not really matter. The result is the same. Absent adequate support, any
effort to develop and enact a uniform amendment will likely fail.
The foregoing accentuates the significance of evaluating the potential
challenges to enactment of a uniform amendment, including the question of
whether achieving uniformity of state law is realistic. The absence of both a
desire to amend and a perceived need to do so is a significant consideration
when examining the related questions of whether, and if, to amend Article 9
for crypto-collateral. Accordingly, the simple fact that Article 9 could be
amended to improve its functionality for crypto-currency is only one factor.
222. See supra Part II.
223. See supra Part IV.A.
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The ability to create a more efficient and consistent Article 9 framework for
crypto-collateral must be balanced against other considerations and potential
hurdles to development, drafting, and enactment of a uniform amendment.
C. The Unknown Future of Cryptocurrency
The unknown future of cryptocurrency, especially uncertainty over its
long-term staying power and ongoing significance in commercial transac-
tions, is also relevant to the question of whether to amend Article 9.
Cryptocurrency is no longer a novelty or curiosity.224 In a relatively short
period of time, cryptocurrency has made strides into the mainstream.225
Transaction volume has grown, and the number of merchants (both brick-
and-mortar and web-based) that accept cryptocurrency has risen.226 Invest-
ment in cryptocurrency and cryptocurrency-related start-ups has increased.227
Cryptocurrency is even used as collateral to attain financing.228 But despite
the emergence of legitimate mainstream commercial uses for cryptocurrency,
there are reasons to question whether it is truly here to stay. As such, amend-
ing Article 9 for crypto-collateral may be premature if cryptocurrency is des-
tined to fade away or fundamentally change in nature.
One reason to question the long-term relevance of cryptocurrency in
commercial transactions is what seems to be a growing view among econo-
mists that Bitcoin’s price gains are the result of a speculative bubble.229 Some
prominent critics of cryptocurrencies, such as Warren Buffett, have offered a
bleak assessment.230 In an interview, Buffett expressed his view of the future
of cryptocurrency, saying, “In terms of cryptocurrencies, generally, I can say
with almost certainty that they will come to a bad ending.”231 Robert Shiller,
a Nobel Prize-winning economist, has also expressed skepticism over the
future cryptocurrency, saying that Bitcoin “might totally collapse and be for-
224. Brito & Castillo, supra note 1, at 1.
225. See Brito & Castillo, supra note 1, at 1.
226. See supra notes 26, 36–41 and accompanying text.
227. See Brito & Castillo, supra note 1, at 14–15.
228. See supra Part II.B.
229. Ben Leubsdorf, Is Bitcoin a Bubble? 96% of Economists Say ‘Yes’, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 13, 2017), https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2017/12/13/is-bitcoin-a-
bubble-96-of-economists-say-yes/.
230. See Brad Tuttle, Bitcoin is Likely to ‘Totally Collapse and Be Forgotten,’
Nobel Prize-Winning Economist Says, TIME (Jan. 19, 2018), http://time.com/
money/5109474/bitcoin-predictions-collapse-economist-robert-shiller/; Brad
Tuttle, Warren Buffett Just Ripped Cryptocurrencies to Shreds, TIME (Jan. 10,
2018), http://time.com/money/5096862/warren-buffett-bitcoin-ripple-invest-
cryptocurrency/.
231. See supra note 230.
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gotten.”232 Shiller went on to say “I think that’s a good likely outcome.”233
Even so, Shiller ultimately acknowledged that Bitcoin “could linger on for a
good long time,” and that it could even be here in one hundred years.234
If Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are indeed experiencing a bubble,
the possibility of a total collapse factors into the wisdom of amending Article
9 for crypto-collateral. The value of cryptocurrency is one of the primary
reasons that it is viable as a source of collateral.235 The value of Bitcoin has
already dropped from a high of nearly $20,000 U.S. dollars for a single
bitcoin in December 2017.236 The price of a single bitcoin now trades at
around $3,615 U.S. dollars.237 Despite a significant fall in price, Bitcoin still
holds value. But if the market was to totally collapse, the price of Bitcoin
could conceivably drop to a point where it would no longer be viable as
collateral. As a result, a price crash could diminish the use of cryptocurrency
and its prevalence in commercial transactions. It goes without saying then
that an amendment to Article 9 for crypto-collateral is unnecessary if
cryptocurrency fades away and is no longer used as collateral.
The possibility of a crash is not the only reason to question the staying
power of cryptocurrency. The development and launch of government-
backed digital currencies and digital currency projects also casts doubt on the
long-term viability of cryptocurrencies. The rise of cryptocurrencies, such as
Bitcoin, has seemingly spurred governments to develop their own digital cur-
rencies and pursue digital currency related projects and partnerships.238 In
January 2017, China’s central bank completed a successful trial of a digital
bank acceptance exchange for settlement of transactions in digital cur-
rency.239 In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England has partnered with
Ripple “to trial a blockchain-based technology that would make cross border
payments and the movement of currencies more immediate.”240 Japan, Swe-
232. See supra note 230.
233. See supra note 230.
234. See supra note 230.
235. See supra Part I.A.2.
236. See Bitcoin (USD) Price, supra note 40.
237. Bitcoin (USD) Price, supra note 40.
238. See Qin Chen, Next Stop in the Cryptocurrency Craze: A Government-Backed
Coin, CNBC (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/30/cryptocur-
rency-craze-springboards-government-backed-coin.html.
239. Id.; see also Zhang Yuzhe & Han Wei, PBOC Set to Be First to Issue Digital
Bills, CAIXIN (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-01-26/10104
9103.html.
240. Lucy Burton, Bank of England Trials Artificial Intelligence and Blockchain in
Bid to Stay Ahead of the Pack, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/business/2017/03/17/bank-england-trials-artificial-intelligence-
blockchain-bid-stay/.
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den, and Estonia are among those who have announced plans to develop a
government-backed digital currency: J-coin for Japan, E-Krona for Sweden,
and Estcoin for Estonia.241 Others who have expressed interest launching
their own digital currency include Uruguay and Kazkhstan.242 In the United
States, the Federal Reserve has indicated that it is in the early stages of ex-
ploring the idea of its own digital currency.243
The foregoing examples highlight the growing level of government in-
terest in cryptocurrency and how to leverage the blockchain technology to
improve the speed of cross-border payments and transaction settlement. The
impact of these efforts along with the introduction of government-backed
digital currencies is uncertain. However, it is reasonable to ponder whether
these efforts may portend the end of cryptocurrency as it is now known. For
example, the application of blockchain technology to improve the speed of
cross-border payments and the introduction of government-backed digital
currencies could conceivably usurp and supplant much of the space now in-
habited by cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. As a result, government-backed
digital currencies could push cryptocurrencies aside. Even if cryptocurrencies
such as Bitcoin remain, they may have less prevalence in commercial trans-
241. See Chen, supra note 238; see also Ryan Browne, Estonia Wants to Launch Its
Own Cryptocurrency Called ‘Estcoin’, CNBC (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www
.cnbc.com/2017/08/23/estonia-cryptocurrency-called-estcoin.html (describing
Estonia’s proposal to launch at state-backed cryptocurrency called “Estcoin”);
Arjun Kharpal, Japanese Banks are Thinking of Making Their Own Cryptocur-
rency Called J-Coin, CNBC (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/
27/japanese-banks-cryptocurrency-j-coin.html (describing efforts by Japanese
Banks to develop a digital currency “pegged” to the Yen called “J-Coin”); Rik-
sbank’s E-Krona Project During 2018, RIKSBANK, https://www.riksbank.se/en-
gb/financial-stability/payments/e-krona/the-riksbanks-e-krona-project-during-
2018/ (describing efforts in Sweden to develop the “E-Krona”).
242. See Chen, supra note 238; Nikhelish De, Uruguay’s Central Bank New Digital
Currency Pilot, COINDESK (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/cen-
tral-bank-of-uruguays-president-announces-digital-currency-pilot-program/
(discussing the announcement of a digital currency pilot by Uruguay’s Central
Bank); see also Ryan Browne, Kazakhstan Plans to Launch Its Own
Cryptocurrency, CNBS (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/17/ka-
zakhstan-plans-to-launch-its-own-cryptocurrency.html (discussing Kazakh-
stan’s plans to launch its own cryptocurrency).
243. See Matthew Boesler, Count New York Fed’s Dudley Among Bitcoin Skeptics,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-
11-29/count-new-york-fed-s-dudley-among-the-bitcoin-skeptics (William Dud-
ley, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, stated that “I think at
this point it’s really very premature to be talking about the Federal Reserve
offering digital currencies, but it is something we are starting to think about.”);
see also Jeff Cox, Federal Reserve Starting to Think About Its Own Digital
Currency, CNBC (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/29/federal-
reserve-starting-to-think-about-its-own-digital-currency-dudley-says.html.
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actions. Moreover, the addition of government-backed digital currencies may
have a substantive impact on any amendment to Article 9. Cryptocurrencies
such as Bitcoin, by definition, are not backed by a government, central bank,
or commodity. A government-backed digital currency, therefore, could be
similar to a cryptocurrency. But it would be distinct in at least one fundamen-
tal way. Because of this, an amendment to Article 9 to accommodate
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin may not be appropriate for government-
backed digital currencies. Accordingly, amending Article 9 to accommodate
crypto-collateral may be unnecessary, or at least premature, as the landscape
is still evolving.
Finally, it is worth briefly mentioning that disparate views about the
legality of cryptocurrency and how to regulate it may contribute to an uncer-
tain future. Broadly speaking, a government’s approach to cryptocurrency
can be divided into one of three categories—those that prohibit or ban
cryptocurrency, those that permit the use of cryptocurrency subject to some
form of regulation, and those that have not addressed the question or remain
silent.244 For example, the use of cryptocurrency is illegal in countries like
Ecuador, Bolivia, Bangladesh, Morocco, and Vietnam.245 Where cryptocur-
rency is not illegal, the regulatory environment is developing at a rapid pace
and may vary widely from country to country. In the United States, for exam-
ple, cryptocurrency is now subject to a host of potential legal and regulatory
requirements,246 including state and federal tax laws;247 state-specific regula-
tory regimes, like New York’s BitLicense;248 state money transmitter laws;249
244. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 301; see also Statistics for Bitcoin’s Legal-
ity Around the World, BITCOINIST.COM (Apr. 18, 2018), https://bitcoinist.com/
11-countries-bitcoin-still-illegal/ [hereinafter Statistics for Bitcoin’s Legality].
245. See Statistics for Bitcoin’s Legality, supra note 244.
246. See Tu, supra note 2, at Part II.B.
247. See, e.g., IRS Virtual Currency Guidance: Virtual Currency Is Treated as
Property for U.S. Federal Tax Purposes; General Rules for Property Transac-
tions Apply (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-virtual-cur-
rency-guidance; Kelly Phillips Erb, IRS Nabs Big Win Over Coinbase in Bid
for Bitcoin Customer Data, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/kellyphillipserb/2017/11/29/irs-nabs-big-win-over-coinbase-in-bid-for-
bitcoin-customer-data/#7a0a9135259a.
248. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, ch. I, pt. 200 (2017); N.Y. STATE
DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., ORDER PURSUANT TO N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 2-B, 24,
32, 102-A, 4001-B; N.Y. FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW §§ 301(C) 302(A) (2014),
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/ea/ea140311.pdf.
249. See, e.g., Money Transmission Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36a-595–612
(West 2017); North Carolina Money Transmitters Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 53-208.41–208.64 (West 2017); Money Transmitter Act, 7 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6101–6117 (West 2017); KAN. OFFICE OF THE STATE
BANK COMM’R, REGULATORY TREATMENT OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES UNDER
THE KANSAS MONEY TRANSMITTER ACT MT 2014-01 (2014), http://www.
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the anti-money laundering provisions of the federal Bank Secrecy Act;250 and
federal securities laws.251 In contrast, China severely restricts the use of
cryptocurrency by prohibiting financial institutions from participating in
cryptocurrency transactions.252
The regulatory environment, however, is not static. It is constantly
evolving and developing. At present, it appears that the pendulum is swing-
ing towards more stringent regulation of cryptocurrency with a seemingly
widespread crackdown on cryptocurrency in progress.253 The following ex-
amples from the United Kingdom, the European Union, India, China, and
Russia illustrate the range of action, from statements of intent to the imposi-
tion of increased regulation. In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England’s
governor signaled a regulatory intervention in likening the trading of
cryptocurrencies to anarchy, raising concerns that one of the main reasons for
osbckansas.org/mt/guidance/mt2014_01_virtual_currency.pdf; TEX. DEP’T OF
BANKING, REGULATORY TREATMENT OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES UNDER THE
TEXAS MONEY SERVICES ACT 1037 (2014), http://www.dob.texas.gov/public/
uploads/files/consumer-information/sm1037.pdf; WASH. STATE DEP’T OF FIN.
INSTS., INTERIM REGULATORY GUIDANCE ON VIRTUAL CURRENCY ACTIVITIES
(2014), http://dfi.wa.gov/documents/money-transmitters/virtual-currency-in-
terim-guidance.pdf.
250. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2013-
G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING,
EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013); U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2014-R011, REQUEST FOR AD-
MINISTRATIVE RULING ON THE APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO A
VIRTUAL CURRENCY TRADING PLATFORM (2014); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREA-
SURY FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2014-R012, REQUEST FOR ADMINIS-
TRATIVE RULING ON THE APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO A
VIRTUAL CURRENCY PAYMENT SYSTEM (2014).
251. See, e.g., Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, supra note
117; SEC Statement, supra note 117; U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Shavers,
No. 4:13-cv-416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).
252. See Matthew Braga, As Merchants Embrace Bitcoin, Digital Currency Still
Struggles for Regulatory Approval Worldwide, FIN. POST (Jan. 20, 2014), http:/
/business.financialpost.com/2014/01/20/bitcoin-currency-merchants-regulators-
2014/?__lsa=592b-fc15; Kashmir Hill, Bitcoin in China: The Fall-out from
Chinese Government Banning Real World Use, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2013), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/12/06/bitcoin-in-china-the-fall-out-
from-chinese-government-banning-real-world-use/#4ffb253b481a; Tu & Mere-
dith, supra note 1, at 303; Statistics for Bitcoin’s Legality, supra note 244.
253. See, e.g., Leeza Mangaldas, Understanding India’s Cryptocurrency Crack-
down, FORBES (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/leezamangaldas/
2018/04/18/understanding-indias-cryptocurrency-crackdown/#10d3f9be5ca6;
John Wasik, Why Bitcoin, Cryptocurrency Crackdown is Gaining Steam,
FORBES (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2018/02/12/
why-bitcoin-cryptocurrency-crackdown-is-gaining-steam/#17ca548b7fb5.
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the use of cryptocurrency is to shield illicit activities and stating that the time
had come to “regulate elements of the crypto-asset ecosystem to combat il-
licit activities.”254 The European Union has also warned that it will regulate
cryptocurrencies if there is no clear international response to its emerging
risks.255 In Russia, the Ministry of Finance has announced plans to criminal-
ize the use of cryptocurrencies as monetary substitutes.256 In contrast to these
statements, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has already acted, issuing a
decree that requires all RBI regulated bodies “to stop having business rela-
tionships with entities dealing with virtual currencies” and “unwind existing
relationships” within three months.257 China is another country that has taken
steps to increase regulation, banning both cryptocurrency exchanges and ini-
tial coin offerings.258
Significantly, the recent crackdown on cryptocurrency is not limited to
increased government regulation. A number of financial institutions and
some of the internet’s largest platforms have also taken action. JPMorgan
Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., Capital One, Wells
Fargo, and Discover have all banned the use of their credit cards to purchase
cryptocurrencies.259 The ban, however, is not limited to U.S.-based financial
institutions. The Bank of Montreal and the Lloyds Banking Group (which
includes the Halifax brand and Bank of Scotland) have both announced a
similar ban for its customers.260 In addition to bans on the use of credit cards
to purchase cryptocurrency, many Internet platforms have opted to ban
254. Richard Partington, Bitcoin Faces Regulatory Crackdown, Bank of England
Warns, GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/business/
2018/mar/02/bitcoin-faces-regulatory-crackdown-bank-england-warns.
255. Samuel Gibbs, EU Finance Head: We Will Regulate Bitcoin If Risks Are Not
Tackled, GUARDIAN (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2018/feb/26/eu-finance-head-regulate-bitcoin-cryptocurrencies-risks.
256. Ryan Derousseau, All The Place Now Cracking Down on Bitcoin and
Cryptocurrencies, TIME (Mar. 19, 2018), http://time.com/money/5198439/all-
the-places-now-cracking-down-on-bitcoin-and-cryptocurrencies/.
257. See Mangaldas, supra note 253.
258. See Sara Hsu, China Serious About Ending ICOs, Cryptocurrency Exchanges,
FORBES (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahsu/2018/02/07/
china-serious-about-ending-icos-cryptocurrency-exchanges/#432d19a95675;
Derousseau, supra note 256.
259. See Naeem Aslam, Banks Banning Cryptocurrency Purchase on Credit Cards,
Why?, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/naeemaslam/2018/
02/05/banks-banning-cryptocurrency-purchase-on-credit-cards-why/; Jennifer
Surane & Laura J. Keller, Bitcoin Ban Expands Across Credit Cards as Big
U.S. Banks Recoil, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-02-02/bofa-to-decline-all-cryptocurrency-transactions-on-
credit-cards.
260. See Aslam, supra note 259; Lawrence White & Emma Rumney, Banks in Brit-
ain and U.S. Ban Bitcoin Buying with Credit Cards, REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2018),
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cryptocurrency related advertising because it is “frequently associated with
deceptive or misleading practice.”261 Those who have banned cryptocurrency
related advertising include Facebook, Google, Twitter, Snap, Reddit, and
MailChimp.262 These platforms no longer allow ads about initial coin offer-
ings, cryptocurrency wallets, cryptocurrency trading, and the like.263 The
long-term effect of this advertising ban is unclear. The effort to eliminate
deceptive and misleading advertising may facilitate the growth of cryptocur-
rency by making it safer. On the other hand, the ad ban may stunt or even
cripple the growth of cryptocurrency by making it more difficult for startups
to build awareness and attract investment.
Taken together, the illegality of cryptocurrency in certain jurisdictions
combined with disparate regulation and an increasingly hostile stance to-
wards cryptocurrency highlight the lack of a clear consensus on cryptocur-
rency. Moreover, the rapid changes and momentum towards more stringent
regulation accentuate the fact that the legal and regulatory framework for
cryptocurrency is still in flux. This raises legitimate questions about whether
it is too early to amend Article 9 for cryptocurrency, because it is unclear
where the law will settle and whether the present view of cryptocurrency will
substantially change in the future. For example, could the dominant view
shift so that a majority of jurisdiction simply opt to make cryptocurrency
illegal? Even if cryptocurrency remains legal, could the recent regulatory
crackdown on cryptocurrency lead to its demise or decrease its utility in
commercial transactions? Alternatively, might the increased regulatory scru-
tiny benefit cryptocurrency by making it safer and more legitimate? The
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lloyds-bank-uk-bitcoin/banks-in-britain-
and-u-s-ban-bitcoin-buying-with-credit-cards-idUSKBN1FO0UL.
261. See Louise Matsakis, The Cryptocurrency Industry Might Actually Benefit from
an Ad Ban, WIRED (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/cryptocur-
rency-industry-might-benefit-from-ad-ban/; see also New Ads Policy: Improv-
ing Integrity and Security of Financial Products and Services, FACEBOOK (Jan.
30, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/business/news/new-ads-policy-improv-
ing-integrity-and-security-of-financial-product-and-services-ads (listing
cryptocurrency as a prohibited financial product).
262. See Matsakis, supra note 261; see also New Ads Policy: Improving Integrity
and Security of Financial Products and Services, supra note 261; see also Jil-
lian D’Onfro, Google Will Ban All Cryptocurrency-related Advertising, CNBC
(Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/13/google-bans-crypto-ads
.html; Ian Wren, Google Follows Facebook in Banning Cryptocurrency Ads,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/
2018/03/14/593553255/google-follows-facebook-in-banning-cryptocurrency-
ads; Hannah Murphy & Alice Woodhouse, Google Bans Cryptocurrency Ad-
vertising, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/45f49684-
2776-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0; Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Bans Bitcoin
Advertisements in Policy Change, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www
.nytimes.com/2018/03/14/technology/google-bitcoin-advertising.html.
263. See supra note 262.
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point is that the future of cryptocurrency is uncertain. It is clear that
cryptocurrency now plays a role in commercial transactions, but whether it
will continue to do so in the future is an unknown. As such, the indetermi-
nacy of cryptocurrency’s long-term viability and the sheer number of vari-
ables currently in flux appear to suggest that it is not yet the appropriate time
to amend Article 9 for crypto-collateral.
D. Further Normalization of Cryptocurrency
This article concludes by raising one final consideration as potentially
relevant to the questions of whether and when to amend Article 9 for crypto-
collateral. Up until this point, the analysis has primarily focused on consider-
ations related to Article 9: whether an amendment could improve the existing
Article 9 framework for crypto-collateral,264 whether the challenges and costs
of enacting a uniform amendment to Article 9 could be overcome, whether
the benefit of doing so is justified at this juncture,265 and whether the uncer-
tain future of cryptocurrency makes an amendment to Article 9 premature or
wholly unnecessary.266 The author now examines broader implications
outside of Article 9—specifically, the potential for an amendment to further
normalize cryptocurrency use and some of the potential ramifications of do-
ing so. In effect, the author begins to tackle the normative question of
whether the normalization of cryptocurrency is a good thing. If so, amending
Article 9 for crypto-collateral may advance the development of an appropri-
ate legal and regulatory environment for the legitimate use of cryptocurrency.
If not, amending Article 9 for crypto-collateral may have the effect of need-
lessly perpetuating cryptocurrency.
To date, the response to cryptocurrency in the United States has largely
been characterized by a willingness to permit cryptocurrency use subject to
the development of appropriate laws and regulation.267 Cryptocurrency,
264. See supra Part III.A.
265. See supra Part III.B.
266. See supra Part III.C.
267. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 301; Tu, supra note 2, at 14; see also
James Gatto & Elsa S. Broeker, Bitcoin and Beyond: Current and Future Regu-
lation of Virtual Currencies, 9 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 429
(2015) (providing an overview of recent efforts to regulate virtual currency in
the United States); Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufac-
turing, and Trade of the Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Repre-
sentatives, 114th Cong. 4–5 (2016) (statement of Rep. Tony Cardenas) (“If
digital currencies are to be widely accepted at [sic] legitimate payments, they
need to provide sufficient safeguards for their users, and they need to come
under an adequate regulatory regime to address unlawful use, particularly in
terms of money laundering and financing of terrorism. . . . States are already
figuring out how to regulate these new products and markets. Federal agencies
are monitoring digital currency markets.”).
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therefore, is not illegal in the United States.268 Instead, attempts have been
made to clarify the applicability of existing laws and regulations to
cryptocurrency. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued guidance re-
garding the taxation of cryptocurrency.269 The U.S. Department of the Trea-
sury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has issued guidance
to explain its position on when the exchange of cryptocurrency constitutes
regulated money transmission under the federal Bank Secrecy Act.270 States
have started to follow with guidance and legislation to address similar issues
under state money transmitter laws.271 The SEC has sought to clarify how
federal securities laws apply to cryptocurrency and cryptocurrency ex-
changes.272 Cryptocurrency-specific laws, such as New York’s BitLicense,
have also been enacted.273
These efforts to develop a legal and regulatory framework for
cryptocurrency provided a needed response to some of the most pressing
challenges posed by the rise of cryptocurrency. Even so, the author questions
whether there may have been another, lesser scrutinized effect on cryptocur-
rency becoming more mainstream. That is, cryptocurrency may have benefit-
ted from regulatory legitimacy. Suppose that each legal and regulatory
development lends added legitimacy to cryptocurrency use, making it more
acceptable and increasing the willingness of people to adopt it. If this is the
case, the legal and regulatory response to cryptocurrency has likely contrib-
uted to the growing mainstream popularity of cryptocurrency as a payment
method and means of investment. To be sure, regulatory legitimacy is not
solely responsible for the rise of cryptocurrency. Each of the following likely
played a part as well: media coverage of cryptocurrency,274 investment in
cryptocurrency businesses,275 service providers that facilitate cryptocurrency
268. See Tu, supra note 2, at 14; Statistics for Bitcoin’s Legality, supra note 244.
269. See supra note 247.
270. See supra note 250.
271. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 301; see also Statistics for Bitcoin’s Legal-
ity, supra note 244.
272. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 301; see also Statistics for Bitcoin’s Legal-
ity, supra note 244.
273. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 301; see also Statistics for Bitcoin’s Legal-
ity, supra note 244.
274. See Alexavier Guzman, The Ripple Effect of Cryptocurrencies, FORBES (Jan.
11, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesproductgroup/2018/01/11/the-
ripple-effect-of-cryptocurrencies/#4efb7bda6080.
275. See Brito & Castillo, supra note 1, at 1 (noting growth of investment and in-
volvement of traditional financial institutions); Paul Vigna & Michael J. Casey,




transactions,276 and the number of merchants willing to accept cryptocur-
rency.277 But the role of regulatory legitimacy in helping cryptocurrency
move beyond early perceptions of being a mere curiosity, or only suitable for
use by criminals, should not be dismissed.
Amending Article 9 for crypto-collateral may, therefore, have the effect
of further normalizing cryptocurrency use via regulatory legitimacy. By not-
ing this, the author does not intend to take a definitive position on whether
this is a good or bad result. Rather, he seeks to highlight that the broader
impact of regulatory legitimacy ought to be considered in a decision to
amend Article 9 for cryptocurrency. To date, it appears the foundational
question of whether the normalization of cryptocurrency is meritorious has
been overlooked in the rush to develop a legal framework for cryptocurrency.
At this point, a fair critique is that it may very well be too late. In the United
States, at least, the decision has arguably been made. The development of a
legal and regulatory framework for cryptocurrency is well under way.278 As
such, any legitimacy stemming from amending Article 9 to expressly permit
crypto-collateral would be insignificant. Even so, the decision to amend Arti-
cle 9 provides an opportunity to take a step back and more fully examine the
virtues of further normalizing cryptocurrency use.
Despite the frequently touted benefits of cryptocurrency,279 there are le-
gitimate reasons to question whether the growing use of cryptocurrency is
beneficial for commercial transactions and society at large. Critics have long
raised concerns about the use of cryptocurrency to support criminal enter-
prise, noting that the anonymity of cryptocurrency transactions makes it at-
tractive for those engaging in illegal activity.280 In addition, the speculative
276. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at Part II.D. (describing the rise of an indus-
try of cryptocurrency service providers).
277. See Tu, supra note 2, at 15.
278. See Brito & Castillo, supra note 1, at 2; Tu, supra note 2, at Part II.B.; Tu &
Meredith, supra note 1, at Part III.B.2.
279. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 2, at Part I.B. (describing potential benefits
such as (1) lower costs and fees; (2) fewer risks for merchants; (3) increased
anonymity for users; (4) increased speed and ease of transfer/payment; and (5)
less susceptibility to government manipulation and inflationary pressures); see
also Why Use Bitcoin?, COINDESK (Jan. 28, 2018), http://www.coindesk.com/
information/why-use-bitcoin/.
280. See Jason Bloomberg, Using Bitcoin or Other Cryptocurrency to Commit
Crimes? Law Enforcement Is Onto You, FORBES (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/jasonbloomberg/2017/12/28/using-bitcoin-or-other-cryptocur-
rency-to-commit-crimes-law-enforcement-is-onto-you/#761fc5603bdc (identi-
fying four primary areas of criminal activity that lend themselves to
cryptocurrency: tax evasion, money laundering, contraband transactions, and
extortion); Jason Bloomberg, Bitcoin: ‘Blood Diamonds’ of the Digital Era,
FORBES (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbloomberg/2017/
03/28/bitcoin-blood-diamonds-of-the-digital-era/#1b52eca6492a (suggesting
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and largely unregulated nature of cryptocurrency makes it ripe for fraudulent
investment scams.281 More recently, concerns have surfaced about the envi-
ronmental impact of cryptocurrency mining activities.282 Now that the use of
cryptocurrency has become more established, policymakers may be in a bet-
ter position to evaluate whether the benefits of legitimate cryptocurrency use
outweigh the potential harms of undesirable cryptocurrency applications.
The use of cryptocurrency in connection with criminal activity is one
issue that sharply divides its critics and supporters. On the one hand, critics
contend that the features of cryptocurrency make it useful primarily for
criminals and that much of the underlying value of cryptocurrency derives
from its utility for criminal enterprise.283 In addition, the launch of increas-
ingly anonymous cryptocurrency variants, such as Monero and Dash, sug-
gests that some cryptocurrency is largely about facilitating crime.284
Supporters, however, view criminal activity as little more than an unfortunate
that criminal enterprise is largely responsible for the value of Bitcoin); Aatif
Sulleyman, Bitcoin Price is So High Because Criminals are Using it for Illegal
Trades, Research Suggests, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.inde-
pendent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/bitcoin-price-fall-criminals-
blockchain-anonymous-cryptocurrency-zcash-monero-dash-a8174716.html
(citing a study that concluded almost half of all bitcoin transactions are associ-
ated with illegal activity and noting that researchers have linked a quarter of
bitcoin users with crime).
281. See, e.g., Ted Knutson, Cryptocurrency Fraud Widespread, Warns Regulator,
FORBES (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tedknutson/2018/04/10/
cryptocurrency-fraud-widespread-warns-regulator/#82c63c16b069 (discussing
widespread fraud among cryptocurrency investment promoters); David Z. Mor-
ris, The Rise of Cryptocurrency Ponzi Schemes, ATLANTIC (May 31, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/05/cryptocurrency-
ponzi-schemes/528624/ (discussing the rise of cryptocurrency Ponzi schemes).
282. See, e.g., Alex Hern, Bitcoin’s Energy Usage is Huge – We Can’t Afford to
Ignore It, GUARDIAN (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technol-
ogy/2018/jan/17/bitcoin-electricity-usage-huge-climate-cryptocurrency; Na-
thaniel Popper, There is Nothing Virtual About Bitcoin’s Energy Appetite, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/21/technology/bit
coin-mining-energy-consumption.html.
283. See Bloomberg, Using Bitcoin or Other Cryptocurrency, supra note 280; see,
e.g., Derek A. Dion, I’ll Gladly Trade You Two Bits on Tuesday for A Byte
Today: Bitcoin, Regulating Fraud in the e-Conomy of Hacker-Cash, 2013 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 165, 179–80 (2013); Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An
Innovated Alternative Digital Technology, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159,
168–76 (2012); Robert Stokes, Anti-Money Laundering Regulation and Emerg-
ing Payment Technologies, 32 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 4 (2013).
284. See Bloomberg, Using Bitcoin or Other Cryptocurrency, supra note 280.
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side effect of cryptocurrency’s growing popularity.285 Cryptocurrency, like
many things, can be used for both legitimate and illicit purposes.286
There is some truth to both positions. Cryptocurrency is increasingly
utilized in legitimate ways. As an alternative method payment, cryptocur-
rency provides some advantages over credit and debit cards, including lower
costs and quicker settlement.287 The foregoing notwithstanding, there is little
doubt that the anonymity of cryptocurrency is attractive to criminals, and
many cryptocurrency transactions are connected to illegal activity.288 A re-
cent study by the University of Sydney and the University of Technology
Sydney found that forty-four percent of Bitcoin transactions and twenty-five
percent of all users were associated with illegal activity.289 Accordingly, the
researchers suggested that approximately twenty-four million Bitcoin market
participants use the cryptocurrency “primarily for illegal purposes.”290
With a significant portion of cryptocurrency transactions associated
with illegal activity, it is reasonable to question whether the continued nor-
malization of cryptocurrency makes sense. That is to say, does regulatory
legitimacy simply perpetuate a tool used primarily for furthering criminal
activity? Because the anonymity of cryptocurrency makes it more difficult
and costly for law enforcement to investigate criminal activity,291 the answer
is arguably yes. Thus, the normative question of whether the ongoing
proliferation of cryptocurrency is meritorious depends on the benefits of its
legitimate uses as compared to the harm of illicit uses, accounting for the
effectiveness of legal, regulatory, and technological developments to curb
criminal activity associated with cryptocurrency.
Another well-chronicled concern is the rise of cryptocurrency-related
frauds and the associated risk of loss to potential investors. Skeptics and reg-
285. See Bloomberg, Using Bitcoin or Other Cryptocurrency, supra note 280.
286. See Brito & Castillo, supra note 1, at 67 (noting that Bitcoin, as a technology,
is neither good nor bad).
287. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 1; Why Use Bitcoin?, supra note 279.
288. See Joshua J. Doguet, The Nature of the Form: Legal and Regulatory Issues
Surrounding the Bitcoin Digital Currency System, 73 LA. L. REV. 1119, 1119
(2013); Bloomberg, Using Bitcoin or Other Cryptocurrency, supra note 280;
Grinberg, supra note 283, at 204; Kier Thomas, Could the Wikileaks Scandal
Lead to New Virtual Currency?, PC WORLD (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.pc
world.com/businesscenter/article/213230/could_the_wikileaks_scandal_lead_
to_new_virtual_currency.html.
289. See Sulleyman, supra note 280.
290. See Sulleyman, supra note 280.
291. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 299; Bitcoin Transactions Aren’t as Anon-
ymous as Everyone Hoped, supra note 72 (describing methods of linking peo-
ple to their Bitcoin transactions); Bloomberg, Using Bitcoin or Other
Cryptocurrency, supra note 280 (describing Bitcoin transaction monitoring
technology as a tool for law enforcement).
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ulators have long cautioned that the speculative nature of cryptocurrency and
its price volatility presents a risk for those who use it as a means of invest-
ment.292 In addition, concerns about cybersecurity, combined with the irre-
versibility of transactions, heighten the risk of loss from cyber-attacks and
theft.293 Cryptocurrency-related scams, however, present an increasingly
widespread problem.294 In the United States, for example, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has reported that consumers were defrauded out of $542
million in cryptocurrency scams during the first two months of 2018.295 The
FTC predicted that this number would rise to $3 billion by the end of the
year.296 Cryptocurrency fraud is also escalating outside the United States. In
Australia, cryptocurrency fraud is now the second most common type of in-
292. See, e.g., Bitcoin: More Than a Bit Risky, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., http://www
.finra.org/investors/alerts/bitcoin-more-bit-risky (last updated May 7, 2014);
Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency-Related Investments, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (May 7, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-
alerts-bulletins/investoralertsia_bitcoin.html; Ponzi Schemes Using Virtual
Currencies, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. & ADVOCACY
(2013), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ia_virtualcurrencies.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Ponzi Schemes Alert]; Michelle Singletary, Bitcoin Is All the Rage But Is It
Worth the Risk?, WASH. POST. (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/get-there/wp/2018/01/23/bitcoin-is-all-the-rage-but-is-it-worth-the-
risk/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8d8a77f59df1; Leubsdorf, supra note 229;
Tuttle, Bitcoin is Likely to ‘Totally Collapse and Be Forgotten’, supra note
230; Tuttle, Warren Buffett Just Ripped Cryptocurrencies to Shreds, supra note
230.
293. See, e.g., Alex Lielacher, Bitcoin as an Investment: Opportunities and Risks,
NASDAQ (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/bitcoin-as-an-in-
vestment-opportunities-and-risks-cm740800; Risk of Bitcoin Hacks and Losses
is Very Real, FORTUNE (Aug. 29, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/29/risk-of-
bitcoin-hacking-is-real/; Daniel Shane, Crypto Hacks: Is Your Bitcoin Invest-
ment Safe?, CNN MONEY (June 13, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/13/
investing/bitcoin-cryptocurrency-hacks-security/index.html; Annie Nova, How
to Stop Your Digital Fortune From Going Up in Smoke, CNBC (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/26/security-issues-reach-a-peak-within-
cryptocurrencies-.html.
294. See, e.g., Knutson, supra note 281; Morris, supra note 281; Deep Patel, 6 Red
Flags of an ICO Scam, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 7, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/
2017/12/07/6-red-flags-of-an-ico-scam/; Shane Shifflett & Coulter Jones,
Buyer Beware: Hundreds of Bitcoin Wanabes Show Hallmarks of Fraud, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/buyer-beware-hundreds-
of-bitcoin-wannabes-show-hallmarks-of-fraud-1526573115.




vestment scam.297 According to the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC), cryptocurrency frauds have become increasingly prev-
alent in the last twelve months.298 The ACCC’s deputy chair, Delia Rickard,
opined further that “[t]he rise in popularity in cryptocurrency has not been
missed by scammers who are latching onto this new trend to con people.”299
It is clear then that an upsurge in cryptocurrency scams has accompa-
nied the growth of main stream cryptocurrency use. Scams involving
cryptocurrency take many different forms, which include hacking,300 phish-
ing attacks,301 pyramid schemes,302 Ponzi schemes,303 bait-and-switch
schemes,304 exit scams,305 and deceptive marketing of investment opportuni-
297. Samburaj Das, Cryptocurrency Fraud Now Second Most Common Investment




300. See, e.g., Neil Chilson, It’s Time for a FTC Blockchain Working Group, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/
techftc/2018/03/its-time-ftc-blockchain-working-group (describing ransomware
cases where bad actors hack a computer, hold files hostage, and demand pay-
ments); Ben Rossen, Ransomware – A Closer Look, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2016/
11/ransomware-closer-look (discussing ransomware).
301. See, e.g., Jen Wieczner, Cryptocurrency Hackers Are Stealing from EOS’s $4
Billion ICO Using This Sneaky Scam, FORTUNE (May 31, 2018), http://fortune
.com/2018/05/31/cryptocurrency-eos-ico-scam/ (describing how scammers
prey on anticipation of an ICO by sending emails to trick investors); Phishing




302. See, e.g., Angela Moscaritolo, Government Shuts Down Cryptocurrency Pyra-
mid Scammers, ENTREPRENEUR (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.entrepreneur
.com/article/310646 (describing Federal Trade Commission efforts to shut
down the operation of pyramid schemes); Wolfie Zhao, Police Bust Alleged
$13 Million Crypto Pyramid Scheme, COINDESK (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www
.coindesk.com/chinese-police-bust-alleged-13-million-blockchain-pyramid-
scheme/ (describing a pyramid scheme that amassed $13 million from over
13,000 people in China).
303. See, e.g., Ponzi Schemes Alert, supra note 292 (describing Ponzi schemes in-
volving virtual currency); Morris, supra note 281 (describing the OneCoin
Ponzi scheme).
304. FTC to Host Cryptocurrency Workshop on June 25, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/04/ftc-
host-cryptocurrency-workshop-june-25 (listing common cryptocurrency invest-
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ties.306 To be clear, the author does not suggest that the mere existence of
fraud should cast doubt on the merits of mounting mainstream cryptocur-
rency use. Fraudsters and scammers are not unique to cryptocurrency invest-
ments. Other means of investment, from real estate to securities, suffer
similarly. However, cryptocurrency investments arguably present a unique
opportunity for fraud due to the combination of investors who lack an under-
standing of how the technology works and a relatively lax regulatory envi-
ronment.307 In examining cryptocurrency investments, the question of
whether growing mainstream use is beneficial depends on: (1) the value of
legitimate cryptocurrency investment as a means of fundraising; (2) the harm
of cryptocurrency frauds, including mounting losses suffered by victims; and
(3) the likelihood that efforts to educate investors308 and increase regulatory
305. See Shobhit Seth, What’s a Cryptocurrency Exit Scam? How Do You Spot
One?, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 23, 2018) https://www.investopedia.com/tech/
whats-cryptocurrency-exit-scam-how-spot-one/ (describing exit scams where
promoters vanish with investor money during or after an ICO, including recent
exit scams during the Confido and LoopX initial coin offerings); Arjun
Kharpal, Cryptocurrency Start-Up Disappears with $375,000 from an ICO,
and Nobody Can Find the Founders, CNBC (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.cnbc
.com/2017/11/21/confido-ico-exit-scam-founders-run-away-with-375k.html
(Confido founders vanished after raising $375,000 in an initial coin offering);
Team Behind $660M ICO in Vietnam Disappears, PYMTS.COM (Apr. 23,
2018), https://www.pymnts.com/cryptocurrency/2018/modern-tech-vietnam-
ico-exit-scam/ (discussing exit scams after ICOs raising $660 million and $4.5
million).
306. See, e.g., At FTC’s Request, Court Halts Bogus Bitcoin Mining Operation, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-re-
leases/2014/09/ftcs-request-court-halts-bogus-bitcoin-mining-operation
(describing deceptive marketing of Bitcoin mining machines); App Developer
Settles FTC and New Jersey Charges it Hijacked Consumers’ Phones to Mine
Cryptocurrency, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2015/06/app-developer-settles-ftc-new-jersey-
charges-it-hijacked.
307. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 281.
308. See, e.g., Nikhilesh De, The SEC Just Launched a Fake ICO Website to Edu-
cated Investors, COINDESK (May 16, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/the-
sec-just-launched-a-fake-ico-website-to-educate-investors/; Elizabeth Kwok,
Know the Risks Before Investing in Cryptocurrencies, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2018/02/
know-risks-investing-cryptocurrencies; ICOs–Howeycoins, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.investor.gov/howeycoins (last visited Feb. 5, 2019); In-




scrutiny309 will curtail cryptocurrency fraud and adequately protect investors
from harm.310 In the absence of both legitimate reasons to permit cryptocur-
rency investment opportunities and adequate investor protections, the risk of
financial harm and the amount of losses suffered by victims of unchecked
cryptocurrency fraud may counsel against the furtherance of mainstream
cryptocurrency use.
Finally, the environmental impact of cryptocurrency mining is germane.
The growing use of cryptocurrency has seemingly little to do with environ-
mental issues such as climate change. However, the massive amount of en-
ergy consumed by computers engaged in cryptocurrency mining activities
has led to concerns about the adverse environmental impact of cryptocur-
rencies.311 Moreover, the increasingly widespread popularity and use of
cryptocurrencies may exacerbate the problem.312
At its most basic level, mining is the process by which new cryptocur-
rency tokens enter the system.313 The creation of new tokens depends on the
use of computational power to solve increasingly difficult math puzzles with
new cryptocurrency tokens as the “reward” for the first miner to successfully
do so.314 As a result, the growing value of cryptocurrency has created a race,
with miners competing against one another.315 This competition has evolved
309. See SEC Statement, supra note 117; Nathaniel Popper, Subpoenas Signal
S.E.C. Crackdown on Initial Coin Offerings, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/technology/initial-coin-offerings-sec
.html.
310. See SEC Statement, supra note 117.
311. See, e.g., Anthony Cuthbertson, Bitcoin Mining On Track to Consumer All of
the World’s Energy by 2020, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 11, 2017), http://www.news-
week.com/bitcoin-mining-track-consume-worlds-energy-2020-744036; Chris
Mooney & Steven Mufson, Why the Bitcoin Craze is Using Up So Much En-
ergy, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/en-
ergy-environment/wp/2017/12/19/why-the-bitcoin-craze-is-using-up-so-much-
energy/?utm_term=.c5bed71b233c; Generating Bitcoin Now Uses More En-
ergy Than Ireland, MAYNOOTH UNIV. (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.may-
noothuniversity.ie/news-events/generating-bitcoin-now-uses-more-energy-
ireland; Karl J. Odwyer & David Malone, Bitcoin Mining and Its Energy Foot-
print, MAYNOOTH UNIV., http://eprints.maynoothuniversity.ie/6009/1/DM-
Bitcoin.pdf (studying the energy cost of Bitcoin mining).
312. See Hern, supra note 282; Popper, supra note 282.
313. See Brito & Castillo, supra note 1, at 8 (describing the process of mining).
314. See Brito & Castillo, supra note 1, at 8.
315. See, e.g., Patrick Daniels, These Are The Largest Bitcoin Mining Farms in the
World, DIGITAL TRENDS (July 1, 2018), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-
tech/largest-bitcoin-mining-farm/ (describing bitcoin mining farms); Anna
Hirtenstein, Bitcoin Sparks PE Fund to Back Wind Farm on Manhattan-Sized
Plot, BLOOMBERG (July 27, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-07-27/bitcoin-mining-private-equity-build-wind-farm-in-morocco (dis-
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into an arms race of sorts, with miners building “cryptocurrency” farms, or
warehouses filled with high speed computer servers dedicated to mining.316
The amount of electricity used to power computers used in mining is
already significant.317 Estimates vary, but some research suggests that the
amount of electricity consumed by cryptocurrency per year now exceeds the
annual energy consumption of many countries.318 The Bitcoin Energy Con-
sumption Index estimates global mining of Bitcoin alone consumes over sev-
enty-one terawatts of electricity per year, which is more than the annual
electricity consumption of countries like Venezuela and Belgium.319 Global
mining of Ethereum requires an additional 20.79 terawatts of electricity per
year.320
The point is that cryptocurrency mining is an energy-intensive enter-
prise.321 Moreover, the energy demands of cryptocurrency far exceeds that of
other payment systems. Although the comparison is imperfect, looking at the
Bitcoin network relative to Visa provides useful context. According to
Digiconomist’s energy consumption analysis, a single Bitcoin transaction re-
quires 954 Kilowatt-hours of electricity, where 100,000 Visa transactions re-
quires 169 Kilowatt-hours of electricity.322 Accordingly, the sheer energy
demands of cryptocurrency presents questions about long-term sustainability
and whether it poses a legitimate climate threat.
In addition to the environmental implications, server farms may create a
host of other problems for the communities in which they are located.323 Min-
cussing plans to build a wind farm for purposes of powering a bitcoin mining
operation).
316. See Paul Roberts, This is What Happens When Bitcoin Miners Take Over Your
Town, POLITICO (Mar./Apr. 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/
2018/03/09/bitcoin-mining-energy-prices-smalltown-feature-217230; Bitcoin
Has a Dirty, Dirty Secret, FORTUNE (Dec. 15, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/
12/15/bitcoin-dirty-secret-energy-use-pollution/.
317. See, e.g., Cuthbertson, supra note 311; Mooney & Mufson, supra note 311.
318. See Cuthbertson, supra note 311; Bitcoin Energy Consumption Index, DIGICO-
NOMIST, https://digiconomist.net/bitcoin-energy-consumption (last visited Feb.
5, 2019).
319. Bitcoin Energy Consumption Index, supra note 318.
320. Ethereum Energy Consumption Index, DIGICONOMIST, https://digiconomist.net/
ethereum-energy-consumption (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
321. Popper, supra note 282 (citing figures from Morgan Stanley that suggest the
creation of one digital token consumes as much electricity as the average
American household uses in two years and the total network of computers
plugged into the Bitcoin network consumes as much energy each day as some
medium-size countries).
322. Bitcoin Energy Consumption Index, supra note 318.
323. See, e.g., Alexis Madrigal, Bitcoin Mining Turns Electricity Into Money, AT-
LANTIC (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/
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ers tend to gravitate to rural areas with low energy costs.324 Public utility
districts must then deal with a rapid increase in demand that significantly
outpaces planned growth, including a flood of new requests for additional
power.325 Mining activity can also stress existing power grids. In Chelan,
Washington, utility crews regularly find “unpermitted home miners running
computer servers far too large for the electrical grids of residential neighbor-
hoods,” which can cause transformers to overheat.326 Residents may also see
increased power rates as less surplus energy is exported to outside buyers.327
Cryptocurrency mining, therefore, has a pronounced local impact, and com-
munities must ultimately decide whether keeping up with the energy de-
mands is worthwhile.
The use of cryptocurrency to support criminal activity, the proliferation
of fraudulent cryptocurrency investment schemes, and the potentially adverse
environmental impact of cryptocurrency mining indicate that a decision to
amend Article 9 for crypto-collateral may reverberate beyond Article 9. By
expressly recognizing crypto-collateral, amending Article 9 adds legitimacy
to the use of cryptocurrency—not only the use of cryptocurrency as collat-
eral, but perhaps for other uses as well. Therefore, the growth of a legal and
regulatory framework for cryptocurrency may normalize cryptocurrency and
contribute to its growth. Accordingly, the development of a legal and regula-
tory framework may indirectly perpetuate undesirable applications of
cryptocurrency and exacerbate the harm caused by such uses.
Because of this, an informed deliberation about amending Article 9 for
crypto-collateral should not focus solely on matters related to Article 9. It
should also consider the wide-ranging implications of continued mainstream
cryptocurrency use. The conversation about amending Article 9 for crypto-
collateral presents an opportunity to re-examine the broader question of
whether the continued growth of cryptocurrency is worthwhile, including the
role of regulatory legitimacy in promulgating cryptocurrency use.
To be clear, the author does not suggest that the development of all
cryptocurrency laws and regulation should halt because it contributes to the
growth of cryptocurrency use and may exacerbate the harms of such use.
Rather, he contends it is appropriate to regularly examine the fundamental
question of whether the continued growth of cryptocurrency is desirable. Do-
ing so allows policymakers to consider new data and utilize an improved
03/bitcoin-mining-arbitrages-cheap-electricity-into-money/555416/; Paul Rob-
erts, Bitcoin Backlash as ‘Miners’ Suck Up Electricity, Stress Power Grids in
Central Washington, SEATTLE TIMES (May 26, 2018), https://www.seattletimes
.com/business/bitcoin-backlash-as-miners-suck-up-electricity-stress-power-
grids-in-central-washington/.
324. See supra note 323.
325. Roberts, Bitcoin Backlash as ‘Miners’ Suck Up Electricity, supra note 323.
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understanding of cryptocurrency’s real-world impact, including: (1) how
cryptocurrency evolves over time; (2) new applications and uses; (3) the
scale of problems; (4) newly identified risks and concerns; and (5) the effec-
tiveness of regulatory responses. In addition, the pressure to react quickly to
a specific issue is lessened because steps have already been taken to address
some of the most pressing legal issues presented by cryptocurrency.328 Ab-
sent the need to resolve a multitude of issues, policymakers can now consider
cryptocurrency policy more broadly. Therefore, as time passes, policymakers
are in a better position to answer the normative question of whether contin-
ued cryptocurrency use is meritorious. As such, the conversation about
amending Article 9 ought to examine the depths of this question, including
the role of regulatory legitimacy in promulgating cryptocurrency use and the
feasibility of adequately curbing the undesirable aspects of cryptocurrency
use.
V. CONCLUSION
The expansion of mainstream cryptocurrency uses and its growing pres-
ence in secured transactions suggests that the time may have come to start
addressing the broader commercial law implications of cryptocurrency. But
the question of whether to amend Article 9 to expressly accommodate
crypto-collateral is complicated. Answering the question requires more than
debating the best way to optimize the process of taking and enforcing secur-
ity interests in crypto-collateral. In fact, focusing the conversation so nar-
rowly is a mistake. Informed cryptocurrency policymaking requires a wider
view of issues relevant to both Article 9 and cryptocurrency generally. As
such, the potential benefits for parties engaged in secured transactions with
crypto-collateral is but one factor.329 The challenges of drafting and promul-
gating a uniform amendment, including legislative will to do so, is another.330
Additionally, the uncertain future of cryptocurrency, particularly the many
threats to long-term viability, is relevant.331 Also relevant are questions about
the scope of problems under existing Article 9 and whether crypto-collateral
use is sufficiently ubiquitous.332 Finally, amending Article 9 provides an im-
portant opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of efforts to mitigate the
harms of cryptocurrency use and revisit the question of whether continued
328. See Tu, supra note 2, at Part II.B. (describing legal and regulatory develop-
ments in response to the rise of cryptocurrency); see also Brito & Castillo,
supra note 1, at 2 (noting that cryptocurrency has attracted the attention of
regulators).
329. See supra Part IV.A.
330. See supra Part IV.B.
331. See supra Part IV.C.
332. See supra Part IV.B.
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mainstream cryptocurrency use remains worthwhile.333 These are just some
of the most noteworthy considerations. As the conversation continues about
the broader commercial law implications of cryptocurrency, policymakers
should take care to explore the breadth of relevant issues.
333. See supra Part IV.D.
